Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Methods: Difference between revisions
Intros and body state upfront that formal voting (Condorcet) is reserved for complex contested questions; links to ladder of decision tools |
Reformulate stakes/consensus wording, Condorcet conditional relevance, sourced 2008 cycle reference, link history page |
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{{KidsIntro|Most decisions do not need a vote at all: people just try things, undo mistakes and talk. But when a big question really needs a vote, there are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}} | {{KidsIntro|Most decisions do not need a vote at all: people just try things, undo mistakes and talk. But when a big question really needs a vote, there are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}} | ||
{{ExpertIntro|None of these methods is meant for everyday decisions: formal voting | {{ExpertIntro|None of these methods is meant for everyday decisions: formal voting is reserved for questions whose stakes, expressed by the number of people who raise them, call for it, after lighter tools (direct action, revert, discussion) have been tried. Condorcet voting in particular is considered relevant where a case is complex and there is a clear, shared perception that it must be put to a vote. Survey of the voting methods WikiDeal is studying: simple majority, approval voting, ranked methods (Borda, instant-runoff), Condorcet methods with the Schulze completion, and single transferable vote for multi-seat elections. A worked 9-voter example shows a Condorcet winner losing under plurality. Each method is assessed against known criteria (clone independence, monotonicity) and known limits (Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, strategic voting). The mapping of methods to decision types is a first hypothesis, consistent with Wikimedia and Debian practice.}} | ||
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=== The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion === | === The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion === | ||
Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it | Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it can be observed in real ballot data: the published pairwise table of the 2008 Wikimedia Board election shows such a circle among three mid-ranked candidates (the exact figures are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research#wikimedia-experience|research page]] and the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Condorcet-History|history and results page]]). | ||
The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis | The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis considers it relevant where a decision is complex and multi-option, and where the need to vote at all is clearly and widely perceived. Even then, a Schulze ballot is intended as a complement to the simpler tools, not a replacement: a contribution that can simply be reverted needs no vote, and a disagreement that discussion can settle needs none either. | ||
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'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|Licensing and credits]] | '''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Condorcet-History|Condorcet history and results]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|Licensing and credits]] | ||
[[Category:Migration June 2026]] | [[Category:Migration June 2026]] | ||
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