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== Transparency commitment == | == Transparency commitment == | ||
WikiDeal intends to publish the full bonding curve formula, constants, and historical data. Community members would be able to verify their Reward calculations independently. The formula is defined, not opaque, and any change would go through an Open Call process with mathematical expert review. This reflects WikiDeal's broader aims of transparency, lower cost, flexibility and citizen participation. | WikiDeal intends to publish the full bonding curve formula, constants, and historical data. Community members would be able to verify their Reward calculations independently. The formula is defined, not opaque, and any change would go through an Open Call process with mathematical expert review. This reflects WikiDeal's broader aims of transparency, lower cost, flexibility and citizen participation. | ||
<span id="related-research"></span> | |||
== Related scientific research == | |||
Algorithmic pricing curves and threshold-based collective funding have been studied in several strands of research. The works below provide scientific context for the bonding curve hypothesis; they do not guarantee its outcome. | |||
* Michael Zargham, Jamsheed Shorish and Krzysztof Paruch (2019), ''From Curved Bonding to Configuration Spaces'', WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Working Paper Series: [https://epub.wu.ac.at/7385/ open access paper]. | |||
* Jiahua Xu, Krzysztof Paruch, Simon Cousaert and Yebo Feng (2023), ''SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols'', ACM Computing Surveys, 55(11): [https://doi.org/10.1145/3570639 doi:10.1145/3570639] · [{W}Automated_market_maker automated market maker on Wikipedia]. | |||
* Robin Hanson (2003), ''Combinatorial Information Market Design'', Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1): [https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022058209073 doi:10.1023/A:1022058209073] · [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market prediction market on Wikipedia]. | |||
* Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher (2014), ''Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd'', Journal of Business Venturing, 29(5): [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003 doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003] · [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdfunding crowdfunding on Wikipedia]. | |||
* Ethan Mollick (2014), ''The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study'', Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1): [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005 doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005]. | |||
'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards Explained]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Need-Driven Funding|Need-Driven Funding]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Main|Why Fund WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call Guide]] | '''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards Explained]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Need-Driven Funding|Need-Driven Funding]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Main|Why Fund WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call Guide]] | ||
Revision as of 17:45, 15 August 2026
💡 In simple words: Think of the very first people who chip in to build something new: they take the biggest chance, so they get the best reward. The Bonding Curve is the clear, public math rule that gives early supporters more Rewards per franc, with no guessing and no secret deals.
🎯 In 20 seconds (scientific summary): The Bonding Curve is a transparent algorithm intended to convert funding support into Rewards: the earlier the support, the higher the multiplier (up to ×100, around ×30 at mid-stage). It is non-speculative, publicly documented, and revisable prospectively through Open Calls with mathematical experts.
| Type | Transparent algorithm |
| Purpose | Reward generation from funding |
| Speculation | ❌ None |
| Covered by | Real expenses + subscriptions |
| Expert review | Open Calls (math experts) |
| Early multiplier | Up to ×100 |
| Growth multiplier | ~×30 at mid-stage |
| See also | Rewards Explained |
| See also | Why Fund WikiDeal |
Every new platform faces the same bootstrapping question: why would anyone support a project before it has proven itself? The first supporters carry the most uncertainty, so fairness suggests they should receive the most in return. The Bonding Curve is WikiDeal's answer: a public, verifiable formula that anyone can check, designed so that trust comes from transparency rather than from promises.
How the Bonding Curve is intended to work
The bonding curve relates the current funding reserve level to the Rewards generated per CHF of support. The key principle: as the reserve grows, each CHF generates fewer Rewards. This recognizes early participants and creates a natural, non-speculative incentive to support early.
For a supporter, the experience is simple: Anna supports with CHF 100 when the reserve is nearly empty and would receive far more Rewards per franc than Ben, who supports the same amount a year later when the platform is established. Both can verify their calculation themselves, because the formula is public.
The mathematical formula
Rewards(CHF) = CHF × multiplier(R) where multiplier(R) is a decreasing function of Reserve R: multiplier(R) = M_max × e^(-k × R). M_max = maximum multiplier (at R=0, e.g. ×100); k = decay constant (determines how fast the multiplier drops); R = current reserve level (total CHF in fund); e = Euler's number (≈ 2.718...). Example at R=0 (first supporter): CHF 1 → 100 Rewards. Example at R=50,000 CHF (mid-stage): CHF 1 → ~30 Rewards. Example at R=500,000 CHF (growth stage): CHF 1 → ~5 to 8 Rewards.
⚠️ This calculation is intended to be discussed in Open Calls by mathematical experts. The exact constants (M_max, k) are subject to community review and may be adjusted through the Open Calls process. Updates would apply prospectively only: they would never reduce rights already attributed at the moment of a support.
Text-based visualization
The relationship between reserve and multiplier (illustrative):
Reserve (CHF) │ Multiplier (Rewards per CHF) ───────────────┼────────────────────────────── 0 │ ×100 ██████████████████████████ 5,000 │ ×80 ████████████████████ 20,000 │ ×50 █████████████ 50,000 │ ×30 ████████ 100,000 │ ×15 ████ 300,000 │ ×6 ██ 500,000+ │ ×2–5 █
Why a bonding curve?
The bonding curve addresses a fundamental bootstrapping problem: how to reward early supporters fairly without creating speculation or securities-law issues.
- Early supporters take the highest risk (platform unproven) → highest multiplier
- Later supporters take less risk (platform established) → lower multiplier
- No external market price needed: the algorithm is self-contained
- No speculation: Rewards are not tradeable on open markets
- Transparent: everyone can see the curve and calculate their Rewards
Who does what
- Supporters choose when and how much to support, and can verify their Rewards independently.
- Mathematical experts review the constants through Open Calls.
- The community oversees any change to the formula, which keeps governance in citizens' hands rather than in a closed boardroom.
Relation to Rewards and Karma tokens
The bonding curve determines the total Rewards generated. The Need-Driven Funding mechanism then determines how those Rewards are split between personal Rewards and the community pool. The bonding curve itself does not determine the Cash/Karma-token ratio: that is the Need-Driven Funding mechanism's job.
Transparency commitment
WikiDeal intends to publish the full bonding curve formula, constants, and historical data. Community members would be able to verify their Reward calculations independently. The formula is defined, not opaque, and any change would go through an Open Call process with mathematical expert review. This reflects WikiDeal's broader aims of transparency, lower cost, flexibility and citizen participation.
Related scientific research
Algorithmic pricing curves and threshold-based collective funding have been studied in several strands of research. The works below provide scientific context for the bonding curve hypothesis; they do not guarantee its outcome.
- Michael Zargham, Jamsheed Shorish and Krzysztof Paruch (2019), From Curved Bonding to Configuration Spaces, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Working Paper Series: open access paper.
- Jiahua Xu, Krzysztof Paruch, Simon Cousaert and Yebo Feng (2023), SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols, ACM Computing Surveys, 55(11): doi:10.1145/3570639 · [{W}Automated_market_maker automated market maker on Wikipedia].
- Robin Hanson (2003), Combinatorial Information Market Design, Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1): doi:10.1023/A:1022058209073 · prediction market on Wikipedia.
- Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher (2014), Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd, Journal of Business Venturing, 29(5): doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003 · crowdfunding on Wikipedia.
- Ethan Mollick (2014), The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study, Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1): doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005.
See also: Rewards Explained · Karma tokens · Need-Driven Funding · Why Fund WikiDeal · Open Call Guide
💡 Improve this concept: submit a proposal via Open Call