Jump to content
Gov  ·  Market  ·  Community  ·  Policies  ·  Funding  ·  Open Call  ·  Get started

Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Call:Cashout-Policy: Difference between revisions

New open call (wave 2, WikiDeal global): percentage of each subscription attributed to Reward holders; 100% first CHF 200k tranche, at least 50% contractual commitment; deadline once CHF 100k donations (Theo 2026-07-15, rectified)
Add Category:Innovation
 
(3 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{KidsIntro|When people pay their small yearly fee to use WikiDeal, that money is shared with the people who helped fund the project. This page asks a big question: how much of each fee should be shared, now and later? Everyone can send ideas.}}
{{KidsIntro|When people pay their small yearly fee to use WikiDeal, that money is shared with the people who helped fund the project. This page asks a big question: how much of each fee should be shared, now and later? Everyone can send ideas.}}
{{ExpertIntro|This open call concerns the share of subscription revenue that is redistributed to Reward holders. For the first tranche of CHF 200,000 donated for Prototype 1, subscription revenue is entirely (100%) attributed to Rewards. If this allocation is modified later, at least 50% of subscription revenue would remain attributed to Reward holders, as a contractual commitment protecting the donors' trust in the possibility of cashing out their Rewards. The call, part of wave 2 (WikiDeal global), would collect proposals and analyses on the exact ratio, its evolution over time and the conditions of any change. No deadline for now: it will be determined once at least CHF 100,000 in donations have been obtained.}}
{{ExpertIntro|This open call concerns the cashout policy: the share of each subscription that is redistributed to Reward holders, and following which formula. For the first tranche of CHF 200,000 donated for Prototype 1, subscription revenue is entirely (100%) attributed to Rewards. If this allocation is modified later, at least 50% of subscription revenue on average (over Prototype 1) would remain attributed to Reward holders, as a contractual commitment protecting the donors' trust in the possibility of cashing out their Rewards. The call, part of wave 2 (WikiDeal global), would collect proposals and analyses on the exact ratio, its evolution over time and the conditions of any change. No deadline for now: it will be determined once at least CHF 100,000 in donations have been obtained.}}


__TOC__
__TOC__


= Open call: the percentage of each subscription attributed to Reward holders =
= Open call: cashout policy =


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 18: Line 18:
|-
|-
| How to propose
| How to propose
| Post on [[Talk:Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Call:Subscription-Redistribution|the discussion page of this call]]
| Post on [[Talk:Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Call:Cashout-Policy|the discussion page of this call]]
|-
|-
| Disclosure
| Disclosure
Line 30: Line 30:
The starting points of this call are the following:
The starting points of this call are the following:
* For the '''first tranche of CHF 200,000''' donated for Prototype 1, subscription revenue is '''entirely (100%) attributed to Rewards'''.
* For the '''first tranche of CHF 200,000''' donated for Prototype 1, subscription revenue is '''entirely (100%) attributed to Rewards'''.
* It is possible that this allocation is modified at a later stage, so that only a part of the subscriptions is redistributed. In that case, '''at least 50% of subscription revenue''' would remain attributed to Reward holders: this is a '''contractual commitment''', made to protect the donors' trust in the possibility of cashing out their Rewards (see the donation agreement).
* It is possible that this allocation is modified at a later stage, so that only a part of the subscriptions is redistributed. In that case, '''at least 50% of subscription revenue on average''' (over Prototype 1) would remain attributed to Reward holders: this is a '''contractual commitment''', made to protect the donors' trust in the possibility of cashing out their Rewards (see the donation agreement).


This call invites proposals and analyses on how this allocation should evolve: which exact ratio, at which stage, for which reasons, and under which governance any change would be decided.
Three options are envisaged for the percentage of each subscription attributed to the cash-out (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Cashout-Mechanism|cashout mechanism]] page for the full picture):
# '''100%''' of subscription money covers the cash-out of Rewards: considered unlikely, because of the dilemma between repaying the commitments first and fragilizing the operating costs;
# '''a fixed percentage''', estimated at 50%;
# '''a degressive percentage''', starting at 100% and progressively decreasing to 1% as holders receive their restitution.
 
For the donors of the first million, the commitment is that the percentage stays between 50% and 100%, that is, at least 50% on average over Prototype 1 (this commitment does not cover early supporters, for whom terms may change in order to preserve liquidity).
 
This call invites proposals and analyses on the best formula: which exact ratio or curve, at which stage, for which reasons, and under which governance any change would be decided.


<span id="open-questions"></span>
<span id="open-questions"></span>
Line 38: Line 45:
* What share of each subscription should fund the redistribution to Reward holders, and what share should fund other needs of the platform?
* What share of each subscription should fund the redistribution to Reward holders, and what share should fund other needs of the platform?
* Should the ratio evolve over time (for example with the number of users, or with the completion of the funding), and following which rule?
* Should the ratio evolve over time (for example with the number of users, or with the completion of the funding), and following which rule?
* Which of the three envisaged options (100%, fixed share around 50%, degressive from 100% to 1%) serves the project best, and are there better formulas?
* Which governance would decide a change of ratio, and how would Reward holders and donors be protected in that decision?
* Which governance would decide a change of ratio, and how would Reward holders and donors be protected in that decision?
* No financial projection with risk estimates has been made on this question yet: which projections and which scenarios would be needed?
* No financial projection with risk estimates has been made on this question yet: which projections and which scenarios would be needed?
Line 51: Line 59:
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscriptions]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscriptions]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Cashout-Mechanism|Cashout mechanism]]


[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
[[Category:Innovation]]
<!-- visible -->
<!-- visible -->