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{{ExpertIntro|We are heading towards transparent, algorithmic redistribution of cooperative surplus through bonding curves and need-driven funding mechanisms. This hypothesis proposes that early-stage funders receive proportionally greater Reward allocations due to reserve dynamics, that each donor freely chooses at donation time how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support, and that ongoing subscription revenue is then shared equally among the activated Rewards of each group.}}
{{KidsIntro|This page shares stories from people who gave money to support WikiDeal.}}
{{KidsIntro|This page shares stories from people who gave money to support WikiDeal.}}
__TOC__


= Funder Stories: How Kim & Noah Earn Their Rewards =
= Funder Stories: How Kim & Noah Earn Their Rewards =
From WikiDeal, the Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · ''Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept ([[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|credits]])''
From WikiDeal, a Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · ''Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept ([[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|credits]])''


WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, '''Kim''' and '''Noah''', to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through Credit allocation, to monthly rewards and cashout. These are illustrative examples based on the Prototype 1 model.
WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, '''Kim''' and '''Noah''', to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through the donor's choice, to monthly rewards and cashout. These are illustrative examples based on the Prototype 1 model currently proposed as a basis for discussion.
== Meet Kim & Noah ==
== Meet Kim & Noah ==
'''Kim''': A 34-year-old community organizer based in Seoul. Believes in cooperative economics and wants to support WikiDeal's early phase with CHF 1,000.
'''Kim''': A 34-year-old community organizer based in Seoul. Believes in cooperative economics and wants to support WikiDeal's early phase with CHF 1,000.
Line 11: Line 15:


== Step 1: The Contribution (Bonding Curve) ==
== Step 1: The Contribution (Bonding Curve) ==
When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] formula. The bonding curve determines how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Credits]] are issued in return. Crucially, the earlier a funder contributes (when the reserve is low), the more Credits they receive per CHF. This is the '''Bonding Curve advantage''', not a payout multiplier.
When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] formula. The bonding curve determines how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] are generated in return, and [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out]]. Crucially, the earlier a funder contributes, the more Rewards are generated per CHF: the multiplier is blocked at x100 for the first CHF 200,000 raised, then the curve declines towards x30. This is the '''Bonding Curve advantage''', not a payout guarantee.


* '''Kim''' contributes CHF 1,000 → receives approximately CHF 100 worth of Rewards (example from bonding curve formula at r=0: ~100 CHF reward = ~10,000 Credits at CHF 0.01/Credit)
* '''Kim''' contributes CHF 1,000 during the first CHF 200,000 raised (multiplier blocked at x100) → her donation generates '''100,000 Rewards'''
* '''Noah''' contributes CHF 5,000 → receives approximately CHF 476 worth of Rewards (~47,600 Credits)
* '''Noah''' contributes CHF 5,000 later, when the curve has declined to, say, x64 his donation generates '''320,000 Rewards'''


Early funders get more Credits per CHF because the reserve is low. As more contributions accumulate, the bonding curve adjusts, and each subsequent CHF yields fewer Credits. This is an inherent property of the formula, not a promotional bonus.
Early funders get more Rewards per CHF because the reserve is low. As more contributions accumulate, the bonding curve adjusts, and each subsequent CHF generates fewer Rewards. This is an inherent property of the formula, not a promotional bonus. Rewards are a potential ceiling, paid only from real subscription income, with no guarantee.


== Step 2: Credit Allocation (The Boost) ==
== Step 2: The Donor's Choice (Need-Driven Funding) ==
Not all Credits go directly to the funder. The [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Funding Stabilizer|Boost mechanism]] splits the total Credits between the funder's personal '''Rewards''' and a '''community pool'''. This allocation is determined at funding time: it does not change later.
Not all generated Rewards are necessarily kept by the funder. Within the frame of the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Need-Driven-Funding|Need-Driven Funding mechanism]], each donor '''freely chooses at donation time''' how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support. Simple formulas are currently proposed to make this choice easy (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]): Pure Patron (x0, everything is given), Seed Keeper (x1, break-even), Harvester (x2, double if it works), or Gardener (the donor keeps all or part of the maximum generated by the curve, choosing the exact percentage; always more than x2). Gardener is the formula most donors are expected to choose. This choice is made at donation time: it does not change later.


* The Boost percentage (P2) defines how much goes to Rewards vs. the community pool.
* Kim chooses the '''Harvester (x2)''' formula: out of her 100,000 generated Rewards, she keeps '''2,000 Rewards''' (twice her CHF 1,000 donation) and leaves the rest to the project as pure support.
* Example: if the Boost is set at '''70%''':
* Noah chooses the '''Gardener''' formula and sets his percentage at 100%: he keeps the full '''320,000 Rewards''' generated by the curve (he could equally have kept only a part and left the rest to the project).
* Kim's 10,000 Credits → '''7,000 Rewards''' + 3,000 to the community pool
* Noah's 47,600 Credits → '''33,320 Rewards''' + 14,280 to the community pool


The community pool portion supports WikiDeal's broader civic and operational goals. The Rewards held by Kim and Noah are what generate future rewards.
The share left to the project supports WikiDeal's development and operations. The Rewards kept by Kim and Noah are what generate their future rewards.


== Step 3: Annual Value Increase ==
== Step 3: Annual Value Increase ==
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== Step 4: Monthly Subscription Revenue Distribution ==
== Step 4: Monthly Subscription Revenue Distribution ==
The primary ongoing reward mechanism is the distribution of WikiDeal's monthly subscription revenue across all Rewards in circulation. The formula is linear and transparent:
The primary ongoing reward mechanism is the distribution of WikiDeal's subscription revenue. Following the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|25/25/50 rule]], 25% of subscription revenue goes to donors, 25% to Early Supporters and 50% to the operations of the project. Within the donors' group, each franc is divided equally among the '''activated''' donor Rewards existing at that moment (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]):


Revenue per Credit = Total monthly subscription revenue ÷ 100,000,000
Revenue per activated donor Reward = (25% of monthly subscription revenue) ÷ number of activated donor Rewards


The denominator (100,000,000) represents the total Credits in the system. This keeps the formula stable and predictable as WikiDeal scales.
=== Example Scenario ===
WikiDeal has '''50,000 active subscribers''' paying CHF 1/month = CHF 50,000/month total revenue, and donors hold '''37 million activated Rewards''' (the illustrative figure used in the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]).


=== Example Scenario ===
* Donors' share = 25% of CHF 50,000 = '''CHF 12,500/month'''
WikiDeal has '''50,000 active subscribers''' paying CHF 1/month = CHF 50,000/month total revenue.
* Revenue per activated donor Reward = CHF 12,500 ÷ 37,000,000 ≈ '''CHF 0.00034''' per Reward per month
* '''Kim''' (2,000 Rewards kept) earns: ≈ '''CHF 0.68/month'''
* '''Noah''' (320,000 Rewards kept) earns: ≈ '''CHF 108/month'''


* Revenue per Credit = CHF 50,000 ÷ 100,000,000 = '''CHF 0.0005''' per Credit per month
Each franc credited consumes one Reward (1:1): the credits accumulate month after month until the kept Rewards are fully consumed.
* '''Kim''' (7,000 Credits) earns: CHF 0.0005 × 7,000 = '''CHF 3.50/month'''
* '''Noah''' (33,320 Credits) earns: CHF 0.0005 × 33,320 = '''CHF 16.66/month'''


=== Scaling Effect ===
=== Scaling Effect ===
As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all Credit holders:
As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all Reward holders:


{| class="wikitable wikitable"
{| class="wikitable wikitable"
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! Active Subscribers
! Active Subscribers
! Monthly Revenue (CHF 1/sub)
! Monthly Revenue (CHF 1/sub)
! Revenue/Credit
! Donors' share (25%)
! Kim (7,000 Credits)
! Kim (2,000 Rewards)
! Noah (33,320 Credits)
! Noah (320,000 Rewards)
|-
|-
| 10,000
| 10,000
| CHF 10,000
| CHF 10,000
| CHF 0.0001
| CHF 2,500
| CHF 0.70/month
| CHF 0.14/month
| CHF 3.33/month
| CHF 21.62/month
|-
|-
| 50,000
| 50,000
| CHF 50,000
| CHF 50,000
| CHF 0.0005
| CHF 12,500
| CHF 3.50/month
| CHF 0.68/month
| CHF 16.66/month
| CHF 108.11/month
|-
|-
| 200,000
| 200,000
| CHF 200,000
| CHF 200,000
| CHF 0.002
| CHF 50,000
| CHF 14.00/month
| CHF 2.70/month
| CHF 66.64/month
| CHF 432.43/month
|-
|-
| 500,000
| 500,000
| CHF 500,000
| CHF 500,000
| CHF 0.005
| CHF 125,000
| CHF 35.00/month
| CHF 6.76/month
| CHF 166.60/month
| CHF 1,081.08/month
|-
|-
| 1,000,000
| 1,000,000
| CHF 1,000,000
| CHF 1,000,000
| CHF 0.01
| CHF 250,000
| CHF 70.00/month
| CHF 13.51/month
| CHF 333.20/month
| CHF 2,162.16/month
|}
|}


''Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber and a fixed Credit count for Kim and Noah. Actual rewards will vary based on real subscription pricing and total Credits in circulation.''
''Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber, the 25/25/50 rule, and a fixed pool of 37 million activated donor Rewards. Actual amounts will vary with real subscription pricing, the number of activated Rewards at each distribution, and the progressive consumption of Rewards (Kim's 2,000 Rewards, for example, can never earn more than CHF 2,000 in total).''


== Step 5: Cashout Conditions ==
== Step 5: Cashout Conditions ==
Kim and Noah can convert their Rewards to CHF when the cashout conditions defined by the protocol are met. Key principles:
Kim and Noah can convert their Rewards to CHF when the cashout conditions defined by the protocol are met. Key principles:


* '''No speculation:''' The CHF value of each Credit is defined entirely by the algorithm. There is no secondary market, no price volatility.
* '''No speculation:''' The CHF value of each Reward is defined entirely by the algorithm: 1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out. There is no secondary market, no price volatility.
* '''Revenue-linked:''' Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to back the redemption. This ensures the system remains solvent and sustainable.
* '''Revenue-linked:''' Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to cover the redemption. This ensures the system remains solvent and sustainable.
* '''Transparent timing:''' The protocol defines clear thresholds for when cashout windows open, Kim and Noah can track this through their contributor dashboard.
* '''Transparent timing:''' The protocol defines clear thresholds for when cashout windows open; transfers are currently proposed to become possible from CHF 100. Kim and Noah can track this through their contributor dashboard.
* '''Proportional:''' Cashout amounts are proportional to the number of Rewards held and the current CHF value per Credit at the time of redemption.
* '''Proportional:''' Each franc credited consumes one Reward (1:1), so cashout amounts are proportional to the number of activated Rewards held.


This design eliminates speculative risk for contributors while ensuring WikiDeal can meet its obligations as it scales revenue.
This design eliminates speculative risk for contributors while ensuring WikiDeal can meet its obligations as it scales revenue.
Line 101: Line 104:
== See also ==
== See also ==
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Funding Stabilizer|Boost Mechanism]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Need-Driven-Funding|Need-Driven Funding mechanism]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards Explained]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|Revenue Structure]]
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscription Model]]


[[Category:Funding]]
[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
[[Category:Migration June 2026]]

Latest revision as of 00:42, 19 August 2026

🎯 In 20 seconds (scientific summary): We are heading towards transparent, algorithmic redistribution of cooperative surplus through bonding curves and need-driven funding mechanisms. This hypothesis proposes that early-stage funders receive proportionally greater Reward allocations due to reserve dynamics, that each donor freely chooses at donation time how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support, and that ongoing subscription revenue is then shared equally among the activated Rewards of each group.


💡 In simple words: This page shares stories from people who gave money to support WikiDeal.


Funder Stories: How Kim & Noah Earn Their Rewards

From WikiDeal, a Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept (credits)

WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, Kim and Noah, to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through the donor's choice, to monthly rewards and cashout. These are illustrative examples based on the Prototype 1 model currently proposed as a basis for discussion.

Meet Kim & Noah

Kim: A 34-year-old community organizer based in Seoul. Believes in cooperative economics and wants to support WikiDeal's early phase with CHF 1,000.

Noah: A 28-year-old software developer in Tokyo. Interested in the Wikinomics model, contributes CHF 5,000 to WikiDeal's first funding call.

Step 1: The Contribution (Bonding Curve)

When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the Bonding Curve formula. The bonding curve determines how many Rewards are generated in return, and 1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out. Crucially, the earlier a funder contributes, the more Rewards are generated per CHF: the multiplier is blocked at x100 for the first CHF 200,000 raised, then the curve declines towards x30. This is the Bonding Curve advantage, not a payout guarantee.

  • Kim contributes CHF 1,000 during the first CHF 200,000 raised (multiplier blocked at x100) → her donation generates 100,000 Rewards
  • Noah contributes CHF 5,000 later, when the curve has declined to, say, x64 → his donation generates 320,000 Rewards

Early funders get more Rewards per CHF because the reserve is low. As more contributions accumulate, the bonding curve adjusts, and each subsequent CHF generates fewer Rewards. This is an inherent property of the formula, not a promotional bonus. Rewards are a potential ceiling, paid only from real subscription income, with no guarantee.

Step 2: The Donor's Choice (Need-Driven Funding)

Not all generated Rewards are necessarily kept by the funder. Within the frame of the Need-Driven Funding mechanism, each donor freely chooses at donation time how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support. Simple formulas are currently proposed to make this choice easy (see the Rewards FAQ): Pure Patron (x0, everything is given), Seed Keeper (x1, break-even), Harvester (x2, double if it works), or Gardener (the donor keeps all or part of the maximum generated by the curve, choosing the exact percentage; always more than x2). Gardener is the formula most donors are expected to choose. This choice is made at donation time: it does not change later.

  • Kim chooses the Harvester (x2) formula: out of her 100,000 generated Rewards, she keeps 2,000 Rewards (twice her CHF 1,000 donation) and leaves the rest to the project as pure support.
  • Noah chooses the Gardener formula and sets his percentage at 100%: he keeps the full 320,000 Rewards generated by the curve (he could equally have kept only a part and left the rest to the project).

The share left to the project supports WikiDeal's development and operations. The Rewards kept by Kim and Noah are what generate their future rewards.

Step 3: Annual Value Increase

A possible annual percentage increase on rewards is under study through a draft Open Call (not yet launched); no percentage is decided.

Step 4: Monthly Subscription Revenue Distribution

The primary ongoing reward mechanism is the distribution of WikiDeal's subscription revenue. Following the 25/25/50 rule, 25% of subscription revenue goes to donors, 25% to Early Supporters and 50% to the operations of the project. Within the donors' group, each franc is divided equally among the activated donor Rewards existing at that moment (see the Rewards FAQ):

Revenue per activated donor Reward = (25% of monthly subscription revenue) ÷ number of activated donor Rewards

Example Scenario

WikiDeal has 50,000 active subscribers paying CHF 1/month = CHF 50,000/month total revenue, and donors hold 37 million activated Rewards (the illustrative figure used in the Rewards FAQ).

  • Donors' share = 25% of CHF 50,000 = CHF 12,500/month
  • Revenue per activated donor Reward = CHF 12,500 ÷ 37,000,000 ≈ CHF 0.00034 per Reward per month
  • Kim (2,000 Rewards kept) earns: ≈ CHF 0.68/month
  • Noah (320,000 Rewards kept) earns: ≈ CHF 108/month

Each franc credited consumes one Reward (1:1): the credits accumulate month after month until the kept Rewards are fully consumed.

Scaling Effect

As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all Reward holders:

Active Subscribers Monthly Revenue (CHF 1/sub) Donors' share (25%) Kim (2,000 Rewards) Noah (320,000 Rewards)
10,000 CHF 10,000 CHF 2,500 CHF 0.14/month CHF 21.62/month
50,000 CHF 50,000 CHF 12,500 CHF 0.68/month CHF 108.11/month
200,000 CHF 200,000 CHF 50,000 CHF 2.70/month CHF 432.43/month
500,000 CHF 500,000 CHF 125,000 CHF 6.76/month CHF 1,081.08/month
1,000,000 CHF 1,000,000 CHF 250,000 CHF 13.51/month CHF 2,162.16/month

Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber, the 25/25/50 rule, and a fixed pool of 37 million activated donor Rewards. Actual amounts will vary with real subscription pricing, the number of activated Rewards at each distribution, and the progressive consumption of Rewards (Kim's 2,000 Rewards, for example, can never earn more than CHF 2,000 in total).

Step 5: Cashout Conditions

Kim and Noah can convert their Rewards to CHF when the cashout conditions defined by the protocol are met. Key principles:

  • No speculation: The CHF value of each Reward is defined entirely by the algorithm: 1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out. There is no secondary market, no price volatility.
  • Revenue-linked: Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to cover the redemption. This ensures the system remains solvent and sustainable.
  • Transparent timing: The protocol defines clear thresholds for when cashout windows open; transfers are currently proposed to become possible from CHF 100. Kim and Noah can track this through their contributor dashboard.
  • Proportional: Each franc credited consumes one Reward (1:1), so cashout amounts are proportional to the number of activated Rewards held.

This design eliminates speculative risk for contributors while ensuring WikiDeal can meet its obligations as it scales revenue.

See also