Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 00:38, 19 August 2026

💡 In simple words: Think of the very first people who chip in to build something new: they take the biggest chance, so they get the best reward. The Bonding Curve is the clear, public math rule that gives early supporters more Rewards per franc, with no guessing and no secret deals.

🎯 In 20 seconds (scientific summary): The Bonding Curve is a transparent algorithm intended to convert funding support into Rewards: the earlier the support, the higher the multiplier (up to ×100, around ×30 at mid-stage). It is non-speculative, publicly documented, and revisable prospectively through Open Calls with mathematical experts.

Type	Transparent algorithm
Purpose	Reward generation from funding
Speculation	❌ None
Covered by	Real expenses + subscriptions
Expert review	Open Calls (math experts)
Early multiplier	Up to ×100
Growth multiplier	~×30 at mid-stage
See also	Rewards Explained
See also	Why Fund WikiDeal

Every new platform faces the same bootstrapping question: why would anyone support a project before it has proven itself? The first supporters carry the most uncertainty, so fairness suggests they should receive the most in return. The Bonding Curve is WikiDeal's answer: a public, verifiable formula that anyone can check, designed so that trust comes from transparency rather than from promises.

Summary

How the Bonding Curve is intended to work
The mathematical formula
Text-based visualization
Why a bonding curve?
Who does what
Relation to Rewards and Karma tokens
Transparency commitment
State of the art

How the Bonding Curve is intended to work

The bonding curve relates the current funding reserve level to the Rewards generated per CHF of support. The key principle: as the reserve grows, each CHF generates fewer Rewards. This recognizes early participants and creates a natural, non-speculative incentive to support early.

For a supporter, the experience is simple: Anna supports with CHF 100 when the reserve is nearly empty and would receive far more Rewards per franc than Ben, who supports the same amount a year later when the platform is established. Both can verify their calculation themselves, because the formula is public.

The mathematical formula

Rewards(CHF) = CHF × multiplier(R) where multiplier(R) is a decreasing function of Reserve R: multiplier(R) = M_max × e^(-k × R). M_max = maximum multiplier (at R=0, e.g. ×100); k = decay constant (determines how fast the multiplier drops); R = current reserve level (total CHF in fund); e = Euler's number (≈ 2.718...). Example at R=0 (first supporter): CHF 1 → 100 Rewards. Example at R=50,000 CHF (mid-stage): CHF 1 → ~30 Rewards. Example at R=500,000 CHF (growth stage): CHF 1 → ~5 to 8 Rewards.

⚠️ This calculation is intended to be discussed in Open Calls by mathematical experts. The exact constants (M_max, k) are subject to community review and may be adjusted through the Open Calls process. Updates would apply prospectively only: they would never reduce rights already attributed at the moment of a support.

Text-based visualization

The relationship between reserve and multiplier (illustrative):

Reserve (CHF) │ Multiplier (Rewards per CHF) ───────────────┼────────────────────────────── 0 │ ×100 ██████████████████████████ 5,000 │ ×80 ████████████████████ 20,000 │ ×50 █████████████ 50,000 │ ×30 ████████ 100,000 │ ×15 ████ 300,000 │ ×6 ██ 500,000+ │ ×2–5 █

Why a bonding curve?

The bonding curve addresses a fundamental bootstrapping problem: how to reward early supporters fairly without creating speculation or securities-law issues.

Early supporters take the highest risk (platform unproven) → highest multiplier
Later supporters take less risk (platform established) → lower multiplier
No external market price needed: the algorithm is self-contained
No speculation: Rewards are not tradeable on open markets
Transparent: everyone can see the curve and calculate their Rewards

Who does what

Supporters choose when and how much to support, and can verify their Rewards independently.
Mathematical experts review the constants through Open Calls.
The community oversees any change to the formula, which keeps governance in citizens' hands rather than in a closed boardroom.

Relation to Rewards and Karma tokens

The bonding curve determines the total Rewards generated. The Need-Driven Funding mechanism and the donor's own choice at donation time then determine how many of those Rewards the donor keeps and how much is left to the project as pure support (see the Rewards FAQ for the formulas currently proposed). Karma tokens are a separate, non-convertible form of Rewards, documented on their own page; the bonding curve does not determine them.

Transparency commitment

WikiDeal intends to publish the full bonding curve formula, constants, and historical data. Community members would be able to verify their Reward calculations independently. The formula is defined, not opaque, and any change would go through an Open Call process with mathematical expert review. This reflects WikiDeal's broader aims of transparency, lower cost, flexibility and citizen participation.

State of the art

Algorithmic pricing curves and threshold-based collective funding have been studied in several strands of research. The works below provide scientific context for the bonding curve hypothesis; they do not guarantee its outcome.

Michael Zargham, Jamsheed Shorish and Krzysztof Paruch (2019), From Curved Bonding to Configuration Spaces, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Working Paper Series: open access paper.
Jiahua Xu, Krzysztof Paruch, Simon Cousaert and Yebo Feng (2023), SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols, ACM Computing Surveys, 55(11): doi:10.1145/3570639 · [{W}Automated_market_maker automated market maker on Wikipedia].
Robin Hanson (2003), Combinatorial Information Market Design, Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1): doi:10.1023/A:1022058209073 · prediction market on Wikipedia.
Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher (2014), Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd, Journal of Business Venturing, 29(5): doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003 · crowdfunding on Wikipedia.
Ethan Mollick (2014), The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study, Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1): doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005.

💡 Improve this concept: submit a proposal via Open Call

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-== Bonding Curve ==
+{{KidsIntro|Think of the very first people who chip in to build something new: they take the biggest chance, so they get the best reward. The Bonding Curve is the clear, public math rule that gives early supporters more Rewards per franc, with no guessing and no secret deals.}}
+{{ExpertIntro|The Bonding Curve is a transparent algorithm intended to convert funding support into Rewards: the earlier the support, the higher the multiplier (up to ×100, around ×30 at mid-stage). It is non-speculative, publicly documented, and revisable prospectively through Open Calls with mathematical experts.}}
-Innovation WikiDeal
 {| class="wikitable"
 |-
-| Nom
+| Type
-| '''Bonding Curve'''
+| Transparent algorithm
+|-
+| Purpose
+| Reward generation from funding
+|-
+| Speculation
+| ❌ None
+|-
+| Covered by
+| Real expenses + subscriptions
+|-
+| Expert review
+| [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call]]s (math experts)
+|-
+| Early multiplier
+| Up to ×100
 |-
-| Origine
+| Growth multiplier
-| 🟠 Crypto / Token Economics
+| ~×30 at mid-stage
 |-
-| Catégorie
+| See also
-| Financement / Tokenomics
+| [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards Explained]]
 |-
-| Statut
+| See also
-| Prototype 1 — En test
+| [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Main|Why Fund WikiDeal]]
 |}
-=== Pourquoi ? À quoi ça sert ? ===
+Every new platform faces the same bootstrapping question: why would anyone support a project before it has proven itself? The first supporters carry the most uncertainty, so fairness suggests they should receive the most in return. The Bonding Curve is WikiDeal's answer: a public, verifiable formula that anyone can check, designed so that trust comes from transparency rather than from promises.
+{{ArticleSummary|
+* [[#how-it-works|How the Bonding Curve is intended to work]]
+* [[#formula|The mathematical formula]]
+* [[#visualization|Text-based visualization]]
+* [[#why-a-bonding-curve|Why a bonding curve?]]
+* [[#roles|Who does what]]
+* [[#relation|Relation to Rewards and Karma tokens]]
+* [[#transparency|Transparency commitment]]
+* [[#state-of-the-art|State of the art]]
+}}
+__NOTOC__
+<span id="how-it-works"></span>
+== How the Bonding Curve is intended to work ==
+The bonding curve relates the current funding reserve level to the Rewards generated per CHF of support. The key principle: '''as the reserve grows, each CHF generates fewer Rewards'''. This recognizes early participants and creates a natural, non-speculative incentive to support early.
+For a supporter, the experience is simple: Anna supports with CHF 100 when the reserve is nearly empty and would receive far more Rewards per franc than Ben, who supports the same amount a year later when the platform is established. Both can verify their calculation themselves, because the formula is public.
+<span id="formula"></span>
+== The mathematical formula ==
+Rewards(CHF) = CHF × multiplier(R) where multiplier(R) is a decreasing function of Reserve R: multiplier(R) = M_max × e^(-k × R). M_max = maximum multiplier (at R=0, e.g. ×100); k = decay constant (determines how fast the multiplier drops); R = current reserve level (total CHF in fund); e = [[wikipedia:E_(mathematical_constant)|Euler's number]] (≈ 2.718...). Example at R=0 (first supporter): CHF 1 → 100 Rewards. Example at R=50,000 CHF (mid-stage): CHF 1 → ~30 Rewards. Example at R=500,000 CHF (growth stage): CHF 1 → ~5 to 8 Rewards.
-La ''Bonding Curve'' (courbe de liaison) est un mécanisme mathématique qui détermine le prix d'achat des WIL (WikiDeal Investment Licences). Elle répond à une question fondamentale : comment récompenser équitablement les premiers soutiens d'un projet sans créer de spéculation ni d'opacité ?
+⚠️ This calculation is intended to be discussed in Open Calls by mathematical experts. The exact constants (M_max, k) are subject to community review and may be adjusted through the Open Calls process. Updates would apply prospectively only: they would never reduce rights already attributed at the moment of a support.
-Sur les plateformes commerciales classiques, les premiers investisseurs bénéficient souvent de conditions opaques ou négociées en coulisses. Ici, l'algorithme est public, immuable et identique pour tous. Plus la plateforme lève de fonds, plus le multiplicateur (remise) diminue — les premiers financeurs obtiennent le meilleur rapport qualité-prix, de façon transparente et prévisible.
+<span id="visualization"></span>
+== Text-based visualization ==
+The relationship between reserve and multiplier (illustrative):
-Ce mécanisme protège la communauté contre deux dérives : la sur-rémunération des initiés et la dévaluation du soutien tardif. Il ancre la confiance dans la mécanique elle-même, pas dans les promesses d'une direction.
+Reserve (CHF) │ Multiplier (Rewards per CHF) ───────────────┼────────────────────────────── 0 │ ×100 ██████████████████████████ 5,000 │ ×80 ████████████████████ 20,000 │ ×50 █████████████ 50,000 │ ×30 ████████ 100,000 │ ×15 ████ 300,000 │ ×6 ██ 500,000+ │ ×2–5 █
-=== Comment ça fonctionne sur WikiDeal ? ===
+<span id="why-a-bonding-curve"></span>
+== Why a bonding curve? ==
+The bonding curve addresses a fundamental bootstrapping problem: how to reward early supporters fairly without creating speculation or securities-law issues.
-Concrètement, chaque tranche de financement levée correspond à un palier de la courbe. Lors du Prototype 1, le multiplicateur de départ est élevé (fort avantage pour les premiers financeurs) et décroît progressivement à chaque nouveau palier atteint. La formule est inscrite dans les documents fondateurs de WikiDeal et ne peut pas être modifiée unilatéralement.
+* '''Early supporters take the highest risk''' (platform unproven) → highest multiplier
+* '''Later supporters take less risk''' (platform established) → lower multiplier
+* No external market price needed: the algorithm is self-contained
+* No speculation: Rewards are not tradeable on open markets
+* Transparent: everyone can see the curve and calculate their Rewards
-Les WIL achetés via la bonding curve sont ensuite convertis en [[innovation-dual-rewards.html|Cash Rewards]] (selon le mécanisme [[innovation-boost.html|Boost]]) et en [[innovation-dual-rewards.html|Miles Credits]]. Le mécanisme interagit directement avec l'[[innovation-annual-value-increase.html|augmentation annuelle de 5 %]] : la valeur nominale en CHF des Credits croît chaque année, indépendamment du moment d'achat sur la courbe.
+<span id="roles"></span>
+== Who does what ==
+* '''Supporters''' choose when and how much to support, and can verify their Rewards independently.
+* '''Mathematical experts''' review the constants through [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Calls]].
+* '''The community''' oversees any change to the formula, which keeps governance in citizens' hands rather than in a closed boardroom.
-Pour les financeurs, la bonding curve fonctionne comme un contrat social explicite : « voici exactement ce que vous obtenez, voici pourquoi, voici comment ça évolue. » Aucune surprise, aucune clause cachée.
+<span id="relation"></span>
+== Relation to Rewards and Karma tokens ==
+The bonding curve determines the ''total'' [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] generated. The [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Need-Driven-Funding|Need-Driven Funding]] mechanism and the donor's own choice at donation time then determine how many of those Rewards the donor keeps and how much is left to the project as pure support (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]] for the formulas currently proposed). [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] are a separate, non-convertible form of Rewards, documented on their own page; the bonding curve does not determine them.
-=== Degré d'usage et évolution ===
+<span id="transparency"></span>
+== Transparency commitment ==
+WikiDeal intends to publish the full bonding curve formula, constants, and historical data. Community members would be able to verify their Reward calculations independently. The formula is defined, not opaque, and any change would go through an Open Call process with mathematical expert review. This reflects WikiDeal's broader aims of transparency, lower cost, flexibility and citizen participation.
-Cette innovation sera testée dans le cadre du Prototype 1 de WikiDeal. Son degré d'usage et les modalités précises de déploiement seront documentés progressivement à mesure que la plateforme évolue.
+<span id="state-of-the-art"></span>
+== State of the art ==
+Algorithmic pricing curves and threshold-based collective funding have been studied in several strands of research. The works below provide scientific context for the bonding curve hypothesis; they do not guarantee its outcome.
-'''Voir aussi :''' [[innovations.html|Toutes les innovations]] [[innovation-dual-rewards.html|Dual Rewards]] [[innovation-boost.html|Boost]] [[innovation-annual-value-increase.html|Augmentation 5 %/an]]
+* Michael Zargham, Jamsheed Shorish and Krzysztof Paruch (2019), ''From Curved Bonding to Configuration Spaces'', WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Working Paper Series: [https://epub.wu.ac.at/7385/ open access paper].
+* Jiahua Xu, Krzysztof Paruch, Simon Cousaert and Yebo Feng (2023), ''SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols'', ACM Computing Surveys, 55(11): [https://doi.org/10.1145/3570639 doi:10.1145/3570639] · [{W}Automated_market_maker automated market maker on Wikipedia].
+* Robin Hanson (2003), ''Combinatorial Information Market Design'', Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1): [https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022058209073 doi:10.1023/A:1022058209073] · [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market prediction market on Wikipedia].
+* Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher (2014), ''Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd'', Journal of Business Venturing, 29(5): [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003 doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003] · [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdfunding crowdfunding on Wikipedia].
+* Ethan Mollick (2014), ''The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study'', Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1): [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005 doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005].
-'''Note :''' Ces innovations sont des propositions concrètes en cours d'implémentation dans le Prototype 1 de WikiDeal. Elles seront documentées et affinées progressivement à mesure que la plateforme évolue.
+'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards Explained]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Need-Driven-Funding|Need-Driven Funding]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|Revenue Structure]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Main|Why Fund WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call Guide]]
-----
+💡 '''Improve this concept''': submit a proposal via [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call]]
-''See also: [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Main|All innovations]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Main|R&D Portal]]''
+[[Category:Funding]]
-''Reference content imported from mockup. Reference language pending (source is FR).''
+[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
+[[Category:Innovation]]