Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Funder-Stories: Difference between revisions
Redistribution narrative: remove ROI/yield vocabulary (Theo 2026-07-16) |
Point NDF links to canonical Economy page; See also + Category:Economy — nav cluster 2026-08-18 |
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{{ExpertIntro|We are heading towards transparent, algorithmic redistribution of cooperative surplus through bonding curves and need-driven funding mechanisms. This hypothesis proposes that early-stage funders receive proportionally greater Reward allocations due to reserve dynamics, that each donor freely chooses at donation time how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support, and that ongoing subscription revenue is then shared equally among the activated Rewards of each group.}} | |||
{{KidsIntro|This page shares stories from people who gave money to support WikiDeal.}} | {{KidsIntro|This page shares stories from people who gave money to support WikiDeal.}} | ||
__TOC__ | |||
= Funder Stories: How Kim & Noah Earn Their Rewards = | = Funder Stories: How Kim & Noah Earn Their Rewards = | ||
From WikiDeal, a Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · ''Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept ([[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|credits]])'' | From WikiDeal, a Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · ''Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept ([[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|credits]])'' | ||
WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, '''Kim''' and '''Noah''', to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through | WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, '''Kim''' and '''Noah''', to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through the donor's choice, to monthly rewards and cashout. These are illustrative examples based on the Prototype 1 model currently proposed as a basis for discussion. | ||
== Meet Kim & Noah == | == Meet Kim & Noah == | ||
'''Kim''': A 34-year-old community organizer based in Seoul. Believes in cooperative economics and wants to support WikiDeal's early phase with CHF 1,000. | '''Kim''': A 34-year-old community organizer based in Seoul. Believes in cooperative economics and wants to support WikiDeal's early phase with CHF 1,000. | ||
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== Step 1: The Contribution (Bonding Curve) == | == Step 1: The Contribution (Bonding Curve) == | ||
When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] formula. The bonding curve determines how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards| | When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] formula. The bonding curve determines how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] are generated in return, and [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out]]. Crucially, the earlier a funder contributes, the more Rewards are generated per CHF: the multiplier is blocked at x100 for the first CHF 200,000 raised, then the curve declines towards x30. This is the '''Bonding Curve advantage''', not a payout guarantee. | ||
* '''Kim''' contributes CHF 1,000 | * '''Kim''' contributes CHF 1,000 during the first CHF 200,000 raised (multiplier blocked at x100) → her donation generates '''100,000 Rewards''' | ||
* '''Noah''' contributes CHF 5,000 → | * '''Noah''' contributes CHF 5,000 later, when the curve has declined to, say, x64 → his donation generates '''320,000 Rewards''' | ||
Early funders get more | Early funders get more Rewards per CHF because the reserve is low. As more contributions accumulate, the bonding curve adjusts, and each subsequent CHF generates fewer Rewards. This is an inherent property of the formula, not a promotional bonus. Rewards are a potential ceiling, paid only from real subscription income, with no guarantee. | ||
== Step 2: | == Step 2: The Donor's Choice (Need-Driven Funding) == | ||
Not all | Not all generated Rewards are necessarily kept by the funder. Within the frame of the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Need-Driven-Funding|Need-Driven Funding mechanism]], each donor '''freely chooses at donation time''' how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support. Simple formulas are currently proposed to make this choice easy (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]): Pure Patron (x0, everything is given), Seed Keeper (x1, break-even), Harvester (x2, double if it works), or Gardener (the donor keeps all or part of the maximum generated by the curve, choosing the exact percentage; always more than x2). Gardener is the formula most donors are expected to choose. This choice is made at donation time: it does not change later. | ||
* | * Kim chooses the '''Harvester (x2)''' formula: out of her 100,000 generated Rewards, she keeps '''2,000 Rewards''' (twice her CHF 1,000 donation) and leaves the rest to the project as pure support. | ||
* Noah chooses the '''Gardener''' formula and sets his percentage at 100%: he keeps the full '''320,000 Rewards''' generated by the curve (he could equally have kept only a part and left the rest to the project). | |||
* Noah' | |||
The | The share left to the project supports WikiDeal's development and operations. The Rewards kept by Kim and Noah are what generate their future rewards. | ||
== Step 3: Annual Value Increase == | == Step 3: Annual Value Increase == | ||
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== Step 4: Monthly Subscription Revenue Distribution == | == Step 4: Monthly Subscription Revenue Distribution == | ||
The primary ongoing reward mechanism is the distribution of WikiDeal's | The primary ongoing reward mechanism is the distribution of WikiDeal's subscription revenue. Following the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|25/25/50 rule]], 25% of subscription revenue goes to donors, 25% to Early Supporters and 50% to the operations of the project. Within the donors' group, each franc is divided equally among the '''activated''' donor Rewards existing at that moment (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]): | ||
Revenue per | Revenue per activated donor Reward = (25% of monthly subscription revenue) ÷ number of activated donor Rewards | ||
=== Example Scenario === | |||
WikiDeal has '''50,000 active subscribers''' paying CHF 1/month = CHF 50,000/month total revenue, and donors hold '''37 million activated Rewards''' (the illustrative figure used in the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]). | |||
=== | * Donors' share = 25% of CHF 50,000 = '''CHF 12,500/month''' | ||
* Revenue per activated donor Reward = CHF 12,500 ÷ 37,000,000 ≈ '''CHF 0.00034''' per Reward per month | |||
* '''Kim''' (2,000 Rewards kept) earns: ≈ '''CHF 0.68/month''' | |||
* '''Noah''' (320,000 Rewards kept) earns: ≈ '''CHF 108/month''' | |||
Each franc credited consumes one Reward (1:1): the credits accumulate month after month until the kept Rewards are fully consumed. | |||
=== Scaling Effect === | === Scaling Effect === | ||
As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all | As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all Reward holders: | ||
{| class="wikitable wikitable" | {| class="wikitable wikitable" | ||
| Line 52: | Line 55: | ||
! Active Subscribers | ! Active Subscribers | ||
! Monthly Revenue (CHF 1/sub) | ! Monthly Revenue (CHF 1/sub) | ||
! | ! Donors' share (25%) | ||
! Kim ( | ! Kim (2,000 Rewards) | ||
! Noah ( | ! Noah (320,000 Rewards) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| 10,000 | | 10,000 | ||
| CHF 10,000 | | CHF 10,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 2,500 | ||
| CHF 0. | | CHF 0.14/month | ||
| CHF | | CHF 21.62/month | ||
|- | |- | ||
| 50,000 | | 50,000 | ||
| CHF 50,000 | | CHF 50,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 12,500 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 0.68/month | ||
| CHF | | CHF 108.11/month | ||
|- | |- | ||
| 200,000 | | 200,000 | ||
| CHF 200,000 | | CHF 200,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 50,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 2.70/month | ||
| CHF | | CHF 432.43/month | ||
|- | |- | ||
| 500,000 | | 500,000 | ||
| CHF 500,000 | | CHF 500,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 125,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 6.76/month | ||
| CHF | | CHF 1,081.08/month | ||
|- | |- | ||
| 1,000,000 | | 1,000,000 | ||
| CHF 1,000,000 | | CHF 1,000,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 250,000 | ||
| CHF | | CHF 13.51/month | ||
| CHF | | CHF 2,162.16/month | ||
|} | |} | ||
''Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber and a fixed | ''Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber, the 25/25/50 rule, and a fixed pool of 37 million activated donor Rewards. Actual amounts will vary with real subscription pricing, the number of activated Rewards at each distribution, and the progressive consumption of Rewards (Kim's 2,000 Rewards, for example, can never earn more than CHF 2,000 in total).'' | ||
== Step 5: Cashout Conditions == | == Step 5: Cashout Conditions == | ||
Kim and Noah can convert their Rewards to CHF when the cashout conditions defined by the protocol are met. Key principles: | Kim and Noah can convert their Rewards to CHF when the cashout conditions defined by the protocol are met. Key principles: | ||
* '''No speculation:''' The CHF value of each | * '''No speculation:''' The CHF value of each Reward is defined entirely by the algorithm: 1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out. There is no secondary market, no price volatility. | ||
* '''Revenue-linked:''' Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to | * '''Revenue-linked:''' Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to cover the redemption. This ensures the system remains solvent and sustainable. | ||
* '''Transparent timing:''' The protocol defines clear thresholds for when cashout windows open | * '''Transparent timing:''' The protocol defines clear thresholds for when cashout windows open; transfers are currently proposed to become possible from CHF 100. Kim and Noah can track this through their contributor dashboard. | ||
* '''Proportional:''' | * '''Proportional:''' Each franc credited consumes one Reward (1:1), so cashout amounts are proportional to the number of activated Rewards held. | ||
This design eliminates speculative risk for contributors while ensuring WikiDeal can meet its obligations as it scales revenue. | This design eliminates speculative risk for contributors while ensuring WikiDeal can meet its obligations as it scales revenue. | ||
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== See also == | == See also == | ||
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] | * [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] | ||
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]] | |||
* [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] | * [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] | ||
* [[Gov/en/Portal: | * [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Need-Driven-Funding|Need-Driven Funding mechanism]] | ||
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/ | * [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|Revenue Structure]] | ||
* [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscription Model]] | |||
[[Category:Migration June 2026]] | [[Category:Migration June 2026]] | ||
[[Category:Economy]] | |||