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Rename Open Call to Open Calls; remove reputation credits (Theo 2026-08-03)
Need gauge: CHF 12,000/month retained as base hypothesis (will evolve) + link to draft Open Call on NDF criteria — per Théo 2026-08-18
 
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{{KidsIntro|The Need-Driven Funding is a tool that keeps money flowing in a steady, fair way. It smooths out the ups and downs so the platform always has enough support to keep going, like a savings jar that balances good months and slow months.}}
{{KidsIntro|Need-Driven Funding is a rule of honesty: WikiDeal first says how much money it really needs to run, like a family writing its monthly budget on the fridge. Donations follow that real need, and each donor freely chooses how many of their thank-you Rewards they keep and how much they simply give to the project.}}
{{ExpertIntro|Need-Driven Funding acts as a reward ratio regulation: a second algorithm, separate from the bonding curve, that adjusts rewards to the real needs of the platform. When needs are low, the corresponding share would feed a provision fund intended to be managed by the Ynternet.org Foundation; when needs are high, the reward would be higher. The funding starts at zero or in negative territory (founders invest before the call for funding), measured by the funding cost ratio. Non-speculative, donation-based, transparent.}}
{{ExpertIntro|Need-Driven Funding is currently proposed as the mechanism that aligns funding with the Ynternet.org Foundation's declared needs. The Foundation publishes a need gauge (an initial requirement plus a variable functioning cost, for example CHF 12,000 per month (the base hypothesis currently retained, intended to evolve), adjustable); the effective Reward multiplier would follow that declared need. At donation time, each donor freely chooses how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project as pure support. The funding starts at zero or in negative territory (founders invest before the call for funding). Non-speculative, donation-based, transparent.}}
__TOC__
{{ArticleSummary|
* [[#what-is-it|What is it?]]
* [[#negative-start|Starting at zero or in negative territory]]
* [[#illustrative-example|An illustrative example]]
* [[#how-it-works|How it works]]
* [[#principles|Principles]]
* [[#relationships|Relationship to other mechanisms]]
* [[#state-of-the-art|State of the art]]
}}
__NOTOC__


= Need-Driven Funding =
= Need-Driven Funding =
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|-
|-
| Purpose
| Purpose
| Reward ratio regulation
| Funding aligned with declared needs
|-
|-
| Cap
| Cap
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|-
|-
| Driver
| Driver
| Funding cost ratio (funding vs. real needs)
| The Foundation's declared need (need gauge)
|-
|-
| Speculation
| Speculation
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|-
|-
| See also
| See also
| [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]]
| [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]]
|}
|}


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== What is it? ==
== What is it? ==


Need-Driven Funding is a second algorithm, entirely separate from the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|bonding curve]], that acts as a '''reward ratio regulation''': the "decider" of the reward. It regulates the ratio between [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] and community pool contributions based on the real needs of the platform. It is intended to be non-speculative, transparent, and designed to reflect actual funding dynamics rather than market forces.
Need-Driven Funding is a second algorithm, entirely separate from the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|bonding curve]], that aims at one thing: '''funding follows the real, declared needs of the platform''', not market forces. It is intended to be non-speculative and transparent, and it currently rests on two building blocks, proposed as a basis for discussion:


* When needs are '''low''', the corresponding share would feed a '''provision fund''' intended to be managed by the Ynternet.org Foundation, for the future of WikiDeal.
* '''The need gauge.''' The Ynternet.org Foundation would declare its real need publicly: an initial requirement plus a variable functioning cost (for example CHF 12,000 per month, set at launch and adjustable). While this declared need is not covered, donations would carry the full multiplier of the bonding curve; once the need is covered and a provision builds up, the effective multiplier would decrease, and the difference would feed a '''provision fund''' intended to be managed by the Ynternet.org Foundation, for the maintenance and development of WikiDeal.
* When needs are '''high''', the reward would be higher.
* '''The donor's free choice.''' At donation time, the donor sees how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] their donation generates, and simply chooses how many of those Rewards they '''keep''' and how much they '''leave to the project''' as pure support. Simple formulas are currently proposed to make this choice easy, from keeping nothing to keeping the maximum: see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]].


The mechanism is not about maximizing returns: it is about aligning Reward distribution with what the platform actually needs at each stage of growth.
The mechanism is not about maximizing returns: it is about aligning funding with what the platform actually needs at each stage of growth.


<span id="negative-start"></span>
<span id="negative-start"></span>
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A key point: the funding starts at zero or in negative territory, because '''investments by the founders take place before the call for funding'''. This is what makes the beginning very attractive. The key variable is the '''funding cost ratio''': how much has already been spent when the first call is launched.
A key point: the funding starts at zero or in negative territory, because '''investments by the founders take place before the call for funding'''. This is what makes the beginning very attractive. The key variable is the '''funding cost ratio''': how much has already been spent when the first call is launched.


Donors and potential donors would receive '''notices''' (suggesting a complementary donation, or informing their network) and would see a reward that theoretically decreases over time, though not necessarily continuously: the private reward for donors decreases while the share for R&D and provisioning grows with revenue.
Donors and potential donors would receive '''notices''' (suggesting a complementary donation, or informing their network) and would see a reward multiplier that theoretically decreases over time, though not necessarily continuously: the effective multiplier for donors decreases while the share feeding the provision for maintenance and development grows with revenue.


<span id="illustrative-example"></span>
<span id="illustrative-example"></span>
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The variables matter more than the figures: all figures below are placeholders, and contributions remain non-speculative donations.
The variables matter more than the figures: all figures below are placeholders, and contributions remain non-speculative donations.


* About CHF 100,000 invested before the call for funding, plus about CHF 12,000 per month of operating costs (salaries, servers, steering committee meetings).
* About CHF 100,000 invested before the call for funding (the initial requirement), plus a functioning variable of about CHF 12,000 per month of operating costs (salaries, servers, steering committee meetings).
* After 6 months: CHF 100,000 + 6 x 12,000 = '''CHF 172,000''' raised would bring the need percentage below 100 percent.
* After 6 months: CHF 100,000 + 6 x 12,000 = '''CHF 172,000''' raised would bring the declared need below 100 percent.
* After 12 months: '''CHF 244,000''' raised would mean the initial CHF 100,000 reimbursed and 12 months of costs covered.
* After 12 months: '''CHF 244,000''' raised would mean the initial CHF 100,000 covered and 12 months of costs covered.
* The variables are the monthly amount (here 12,000) and the number of months of security wanted (typically 3): CHF 100,000 + 15 x 12,000 = '''CHF 280,000'''.
* The variables are the monthly amount (here 12,000) and the number of months of provision wanted (typically 3): a provision target of 3 x 12,000 = '''CHF 36,000'''. The criteria themselves (what counts as the real need, which costs are incompressible and which are reducible, such as Open Call budgets) are proposed for study in a draft [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Need-Driven-Funding-Criteria|wave 2 Open Call]].
* On a funding curve going from x100 down to x30: a first round of CHF 200,000 (out of a CHF 1,000,000 target) at x100, then a decrease. At CHF 280,000 raised, the CHF 80,000 above 200,000 would average about x85, and the difference between x85 and x30 would benefit the provision fund of the Ynternet.org Foundation.
* On a funding curve where the multiplier is blocked at x100 for the first CHF 200,000 raised (out of a CHF 1,000,000 target), then declines towards x30: once the declared need is covered, the difference between the multiplier promised by the curve and the effective reward attributed would benefit the provision fund of the Ynternet.org Foundation.


<span id="how-it-works"></span>
<span id="how-it-works"></span>
== How it works ==
== How it works ==


The mechanism continuously adjusts the split between:
The model currently proposed as a basis for discussion works in two steps:


* '''Personal Rewards ([[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]], P2)''': held in individual accounts, potentially convertible to CHF.
* '''The effective multiplier follows the declared need.''' The bonding curve announces a multiplier; the declared need modulates it. While the need is at 100 percent (not yet covered), the full multiplier would apply. Once the need is covered and the provision fills, the effective multiplier would descend continuously: there is no fixed cap, no sudden thresholds, no arbitrary percentages. The difference would stay with the Foundation and feed the provision.
* '''Community pool''': funding [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:User Groups|User Groups]], shared infrastructure, collective projects (including [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] for services).
* '''The donor decides what their donation becomes.''' Once the generated Rewards are displayed, the donor chooses the share they '''keep''' (potentially convertible, 1 Reward = CHF 1 when cashed out, without guarantee) and the share they '''leave to the project''' as pure support. This choice is made at donation time and does not change later.


The ratio changes based on the platform's funding cost ratio. This is a continuous curve: there is no fixed cap, no sudden thresholds, no arbitrary percentages. The intended sequence: in early stages, more Rewards flow to the community pool (the platform needs community engagement first); as the platform grows and subscription revenue rises, more Rewards flow to personal accounts, so funders who waited are progressively rewarded.
This goes in this tendency and is the model currently proposed; the exact formula is intended to be published and reviewed.


<span id="principles"></span>
<span id="principles"></span>
== Principles ==
== Principles ==


* Non-speculative: the ratio changes based on real needs, not market sentiment.
* Non-speculative: funding follows real, declared needs, not market sentiment.
* Transparent: the formula is intended to be published, auditable, and subject to [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call]] review.
* Transparent: the need gauge and the formula are intended to be published, auditable, and subject to [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Call]] review.
* At-cost: no extraction beyond what the platform needs to operate.
* At-cost: no extraction beyond what the platform needs to operate.
* Community-first: community utility is built before personal returns are maximized.
* Free choice: each donor decides how many of the generated Rewards they keep and how much they leave to the project.


<span id="relationships"></span>
<span id="relationships"></span>
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* '''[[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding curve]]''' → determines total Rewards generated per CHF.
* '''[[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding curve]]''' → determines total Rewards generated per CHF.
* '''Need-Driven Funding''' → determines how those Rewards are split (personal vs. community).
* '''Need-Driven Funding''' → aligns the effective reward with the Foundation's declared need, and frames the donor's choice of Rewards kept versus support left to the project.
* '''[[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscription model]]''' → provides the revenue that would make Rewards convertible.
* '''[[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscription model]]''' → provides the revenue that would make Rewards convertible, following the [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|25/25/50 rule]].


The combination of the bonding curve and Need-Driven Funding creates a self-regulation that makes [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Exit To Community|Exit to Community]] much less speculative: based only on real flows and real needs.
The combination of the bonding curve and Need-Driven Funding creates a self-regulation that makes [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Exit To Community|Exit to Community]] much less speculative: based only on real flows and real needs.


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'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscription Model]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Main|All innovations]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Calls]]
 
<span id="state-of-the-art"></span>
== State of the art ==
Adjusting rewards to the real needs of a shared platform relates to the economics of clubs, nonprofit enterprise and threshold funding mechanisms. The references below situate this invention in existing research.
 
* James M. Buchanan (1965), ''An Economic Theory of Clubs'', Economica, 32(125): [https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442 doi:10.2307/2552442] · [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Club_good club good on Wikipedia].
* Henry Hansmann (1980), ''The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise'', Yale Law Journal, 89(5): [https://doi.org/10.2307/796089 doi:10.2307/796089].
* Alexander Tabarrok (1998), ''The private provision of public goods via dominant assurance contracts'', Public Choice, 96: [https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004957109535 doi:10.1023/A:1004957109535] · [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assurance_contract assurance contract on Wikipedia].
* Ethan Mollick (2014), ''The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study'', Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1), on threshold (all-or-nothing) funding: [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005 doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005].
* René Bekkers and Pamala Wiepking (2011), ''A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving'', Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(5): [https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764010380927 doi:10.1177/0899764010380927].
 
'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards-FAQ|Rewards FAQ]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Revenue-Structure|Revenue Structure]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Karma-Tokens|Karma tokens]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Subscriptions|Subscription Model]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Main|All innovations]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Open-Calls:Main|Open Calls]]


[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
[[Category:Innovation]]
[[Category:Innovation]]
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