Markets/en/Portal:Street Fundraising/Main

💡 In simple words: A friendly, honest way to raise support on the street for good causes. People who sign up passers-by would be rewarded for keeping supporters happy over time, not just for signing them up.

🎯 In 20 seconds (scientific summary): A community-governed alternative to the traditional agency model for face-to-face fundraising. It replaces high upfront acquisition fees with a subscription-based retention incentive, using the WikiDeal framework to align the interests of non-profit beneficiaries, dialoguers, and donors.

Status: proposal, initial hypothesis. Everything on this page is proposed as a base for discussion. All figures are illustrative working values, not commitments.

Street Fundraising

Street fundraising, the practice of dialoguers approaching passers-by to collect subscriptions for a cause, is one of the most effective yet contested models in nonprofit fundraising. WikiDeal is exploring a transparent, contract-based, community-governed alternative to the traditional agency model.

No real organization names appear on this page: variables in brackets, such as [NGO name], stand for any non-profit, foundation or coalition.

Use case overview

Type	Street fundraising / face-to-face donation
Target	1. Non-profit (NGOs, non-profits, foundations), 2. Dialoguers, 3. Donators
Intermediation	Dialoguers + the WikiDeal platform
Contract model	3-contract system (see the three contracts)
User Group(s)	Street Fundraising User Group (proposed)
Ring(s)	[NGO Solidarity Ring] (illustrative)
Active funders	18 (illustrative placeholder)
Contracts signed	0 (pre-launch)
Cash-to-Karma-token ratio	45% / 55% (illustrative, would vary with the Need-Driven Funding)
Average satisfaction	not yet measured (pre-launch)
Deployment	Use case prototype one regional Switzerland envisaged
Program	Street Fundraising Program
Licence	Free licence: AGPL v3 · GNU/Linux
Status	🔬 Applied research prototype
Maturity	⭐⭐☆☆☆ (in development)

Context: the model observed today

Today, many large non-profits and coalitions (for example in health, human rights, climate or social justice) outsource street fundraising to specialized agencies. These agencies recruit and manage dialoguers, paid staff who engage passers-by to sign up for monthly donations.

• Agencies are commonly reported to charge the equivalent of 1 to 1.5 years of subscription for each new subscriber acquired.
• A non-profit beneficiary of donations may not break even on a new donation yearly subscription until the second year, if that donor doesn\'t cancel the automatic charging.
• Dialoguers are often young, mobile, on temporary contracts, and loosely integrated into the non-profit culture.
• The passerby has limited information about how the subscription is used in the first year.

Problems with the current system

As described in the initial notes this page starts from:

• 💰 High agency commissions: up to 100% of first-year dues can go to the agency.
• 🔒 Inflexibility: contracts are rigid; there is usually no mechanism for sharing revenue over time.
• 👥 Narrow profiles: mostly young, mobile people can participate as dialoguers (few retirees, few social aid beneficiaries, few committed volunteers).
• ⚠️ Misaligned incentives: dialoguers are incentivized to maximize sign-ups, not long-term retention.
• 🔍 Opacity: passers-by do not know where their money goes in the first year.
• 📉 High churn: many subscribers cancel within 12 months, leaving non-profits with little after paying agency fees.

The three needs this program starts from

The program is built around three needs expressed by non-profits and dialoguers:

1. Workforce flexibility: stands at festivals, markets, train stations and shopping centres need staffing that can scale up and down per event.
2. Broader profiles: not only students, but also retirees, social aid beneficiaries and committed volunteers should be able to take part, with contracts adapted to each status.
3. Flexible revenue distribution: instead of a large up-front acquisition fee, revenue could be spread over time, for example 6 months instead of 18, or around 20% per year over 10 years (illustrative options).

The direction explored

The direction explored: WikiDeal would distribute the "acquisition fee" across the life of the subscription, using the bonding curve to generate Rewards.

The keys of success proposed for this use case:

• Instead of paying the equivalent of the first year to an agency, the non-profit would distribute revenue over time (for example around 20% per year over 10 years, illustrative).
• Broader profiles: retirees, social aid beneficiaries, students: the intent is that anyone could become a dialoguer.
• Community governance: User Groups would coordinate dialoguers, set standards and manage training.
• Transparency: every subscriber would see how their subscription is distributed.
• Free licensing: the platform is intended to run on free/libre software (AGPL v3, GNU/Linux), community-maintained.

The corrected side effect

A recurring pattern in traditional street fundraising is the high cancellation rate after the first year. The current system and contracts are often structured in a way that leaves non-profit beneficiaries crossing their fingers, hoping for a high percentage of donors who do not cancel after a year. Without blaming the dialoguers, the system is built in such a way that it wouldn't be surprising if sometimes, to convince a person to accept a recurring annual payment, they explain that cancellation is very simple and that the donor shouldn't hesitate to cancel quickly. This lowers the barrier to entry—knowing that calls for contribution can sometimes be quite intense—but it generates sign-up commissions while leaving the non-profit beneficiary with little after early cancellations.

The correction explored: revenue would be spread over time (for example 10 years). A subscriber who cancels after 1 year would generate only a small share of the total expected value, and the dialoguer's Rewards would reflect this. The intent is to correct the misaligned incentive by tying dialoguer rewards to subscriber retention, not just acquisition.

• If the subscriber stays 10 years: the dialoguer would receive 10 times the yearly share, the full value (illustrative).
• If the subscriber cancels after 1 year: the dialoguer would receive only that year's share (illustrative).
• An algorithm could alert dialoguers when their subscriber-retention score drops below a threshold. ⚠️

The three contracts

The use case relies on three distinct contracts. As an entry point, each contract would display its key indicators at the top: duration, cash-to-Karma-token split, payout plan, and average subscriptions per hour (for example 2 to 4 on a regular day, 6 to 10 at a festival; illustrative).

Contract A: Non-profit and User Group

Purpose: framework agreement defining the relationship between an [NGO name] and a WikiDeal User Group that agrees to conduct fundraising on its behalf.

• Integration clause: the User Group would commit to represent the non-profit faithfully and in accordance with its values.
• Revenue sharing: a share of subscriber dues (around 10% lifetime in the current working hypothesis, illustrative) would be allocated to User Group operating costs and Rewards.
• Participatory audit clause: the non-profit would retain the right to audit User Group activity.
• Non-exclusivity: a User Group could represent multiple non-profits, with transparent disclosure.
• Exit clause: notice period and data portability.

⚠️ Alert clause: if the subscriber retention rate falls below an agreed threshold, an automatic review would be triggered.

Contract B: Non-profit and Dialoguer

Purpose: individual contract based on an existing internship agreement used as a base model, adapted with WikiDeal Rewards.

• Key indicators at the top of the contract: duration, cash-to-Karma-token split, payout plan, average subscriptions per hour.
• Trial period: one quarter, during which either party could end the contract without stating a motive.
• Pause: the contract could be put on pause at any time.
• Material clause: any material provided would be recorded with its value, with a debt clause if it is not returned.
• Quarterly obligations: agreed minimum activity per quarter, including at least one social activity per quarter, and completion of training modules.
• Insurance: the User Group would provide civil liability coverage during events (to be confirmed with legal review).

⚠️ Alert icons: contracts would use a graphic nomenclature of alert icons, with three levels: advisory (yellow), warning (orange), suspension review (red).

Eligible profiles: dialoguers (paid or unpaid), retirees, social aid beneficiaries (with the required notifications), students.

Contract C: Donation contract (passerby to non-profit)

Purpose: the subscription contract signed by a new supporter on the street or online, with counterparts.

• A recurring WikiDeal subscription (around CHF 1 per month or CHF 10 per year, a discount for paying a year in advance; working hypothesis, illustrative). A subscription can also be offered by a third party, for example a non-profit offering it to its volunteers: see offered subscriptions.
• Minimum duration: month to month, cancel anytime.
• Counterparts: the core idea is to create a genuine social connection tailored to people's interests. For some, this might be a film screening or a concert; for others, a phone call, a coffee meet-up with other members, or attending the general assembly. Everyone can find their own area of interest.
• Revenue transparency: the subscriber could see the full distribution table at any time.
• Karma tokens: the subscriber would accumulate Karma tokens from a continuous subscription.
• Data portability: subscriber data exportable at any time, in line with data protection law (GDPR).

⚠️ Cancellation window: a cooling-off period after the first subscription (14 days in the current working hypothesis).

The Need-Driven Funding applied per event

The split between Rewards (convertible to cash, no guarantee) and Karma tokens (for the community) would depend on the attractiveness of the event, regulated by the Need-Driven Funding. Illustrative examples:

• Low attraction event (few volunteers, difficult location): up to 100% Rewards (no guarantee), to attract participants.
• Medium attraction event (city centre, regular day): around 50% Rewards / 50% Karma tokens.
• High attraction event (popular festival, peak season): around 25% Rewards / 75% Karma tokens, the community benefits.

The ratio would be flexible per event, and an algorithm could adjust it based on sign-up rate and volunteer count.

Time bank and resource bank

Beyond monetary compensation, the use case explores non-monetary exchange:

• Time bank: 1 hour of fundraising would equal 1 Karma token, redeemable for peer services (training, childcare, legal advice).
• Resource bank: members could share resources valued in Karma tokens:
  • 🏠 Holiday housing (token per night)
  • 🚗 Transport (token per km)
  • 🍽️ Food (token per meal, via solidarity meals)
• Conversion: around 1 CHF equivalent per Karma token (advisory working value, not legally binding).

Bidirectional evaluation

The use case explores a bidirectional evaluation system: not a binary rating, both parties express themselves. The dialoguer evaluates the non-profit and the non-profit evaluates the dialoguer.

• Balance-of-judgement indicator: a dedicated, independent page would display how balanced each party's feedback is over time.
• Pre-written feedback lists: standard phrases per category (professionalism, communication, impact, and so on).
• AI-assisted suggestions: based on session data, the AI could propose relevant feedback phrases.
• Rewards for feedback: completing feedback would earn Rewards (around 1 CHF equivalent per minute in the current working hypothesis, with a cap; illustrative).
• Refusing to give feedback would lead to significant deductions.
• Non-profits would also be evaluated by dialoguers: poor management or lack of materials could be flagged transparently.

Categorization of non-profits

• By theme: environment, human rights, health, culture, education, local development.
• By geographic region: cantons (CH), departments (FR), provinces (BE), and so on.
• By type of organization: emergency relief, long-term development, advocacy, services.
• Attraction indicator: a composite indicator covering the financial dimension, the festive dimension, the socialization dimension and the quality of the venue.
• Public statistics: success rates and numbers of participants would be public.

User Group coordination

• Collision avoidance: a calendar system would prevent two similar organizations deploying at the same place at the same time.
• Festival contacts: a shared database of festival organizers, permits and contact persons, used for selections.
• Elected delegates: non-profits would elect delegates, forming an operational bureau.
• At real cost: coordination would operate at real cost, with any surplus returned.

Two distinct User Groups

The initial notes distinguish two separate User Groups:

1. Street Fundraising User Group: fundraising (donations) for NGOs and non-profits, the subject of this page.
2. Internship User Group: semi-paid internships and training placements, learning by doing, based on an existing internship agreement used as a base model.

Training model

The training model explored is participatory and bottom-up, not top-down instruction:

• Regional meals (quarterly): informal knowledge sharing, peer feedback.
• Thematic committees: dialoguers self-organize by interest (sports, culture, and so on).
• Seniors coach juniors: experienced dialoguers would mentor newcomers and earn Rewards for mentoring.
• Online modules: a set of required modules (platform, contract basics, communication, ethics, AI tools).

AI assistance

The WikiDeal internal AI could send real-time messages to dialoguers:

• "3 hours on site: your current score is 2.1 subscriptions per hour against a target of 3.0. Consider changing location or pitch."
• "High foot traffic expected at [festival name] tomorrow: 8 spots available. Sign up?"
• "Your subscriber at position #127 has been active for 18 months. Well done!"
• "Rewards: your User Group is 40 Rewards from the next milestone."

Illustrative scenario

Scenario (all names are variables in brackets): [NGO name] partners with the WikiDeal User Group [User Group name] in [city] for the annual [festival name] on [date].

[Dialoguer first name], 63, a retired teacher, signs up for a 4-hour slot at [stand location]. Her target: 3 subscriptions per hour (illustrative).

At 3 hours in, the WikiDeal internal AI sends: "[Dialoguer first name]: 3 hours on site, 7 subscriptions so far (2.3 per hour against a target of 3.0). Suggestion: move 50 metres north, near the main stage."

By the end of the shift, she records 13 subscriptions. With the Need-Driven Funding at 50% for this popular festival, the value would be split 50% Rewards / 50% Karma tokens for the community pool.

Her Rewards (no guarantee) would be visible in her dashboard. The community pool Karma tokens would flow to [User Group name] for collective projects.

Frequently asked questions

Q: Why is the WikiDeal subscription so low compared to an NGO donation?

A: The WikiDeal subscription is the platform subscription for the intermediation layer. Non-profits would set their own donation amounts. WikiDeal's role would be to manage the contracts and Rewards system, not to replace the donation itself.

Q: Can a retired person really be a dialoguer?

A: That is the intent. The use case specifically opens the dialoguer role to retirees, students, social aid beneficiaries (with the required notifications) and volunteers. The contracts would be adapted to each status.

Q: What happens to Rewards if the non-profit leaves WikiDeal?

A: Rewards would be issued on the bonding curve and belong to the individual. They would not be non-profit-specific: if a non-profit leaves, Rewards already earned would not be affected.

Q: How would the revenue spread work in practice?

A: In the illustrative 10-year option, for each active subscription, around 20% of the yearly value would be allocated to the acquisition cost each year for 10 years, instead of the full amount in year 1. A dialoguer who enrolled a subscriber who stays 5 years would receive 5 yearly shares: the same logic, but spread over time and tied to retention. A shorter spread (for example 6 months instead of 18) is another option under discussion.

Q: What is the corrected side effect exactly?

A: Some dialoguers tell passers-by "sign up for a year, cancel after". This gets them a commission while leaving the NGO with little after the cancellation. The proposed correction ties Rewards to subscriber retention, not just acquisition.

Q: How would the per-event ratio be determined?

A: The algorithm could consider the number of volunteers available, the historical sign-up rate at that location or event, the weather and the time of year. A low supply of volunteers would mean a higher share of Rewards (no guarantee) to attract participants; a high supply at a popular event would mean a larger share going to Karma tokens.

Q: Is this legal under Swiss, French or Belgian labour law?

A: The contracts are intended to comply with applicable labour law. For paid dialoguers, standard employment protections would apply. For unpaid dialoguers, the non-profit volunteer framework would be used. Legal review is part of the required community roles (see Contribute as a legal professional).

Q: Can a User Group represent multiple non-profits at once?

A: That is the working hypothesis, with full transparency. Subscribers and dialoguers could see which non-profits a User Group represents. Conflict of interest rules would prevent representing directly competing organizations.

Success indicators (illustrative targets)

Key performance indicators proposed for this use case. These targets are illustrative and community-modifiable as the program matures. See also the WikiDeal success criteria.

Indicator	Illustrative target	Description
Active dialoguers per month	at least 100	Registered dialoguers conducting at least one session per month
New subscribers per month	at least 500	New subscribers enrolled through street activity
Subscriber 12-month retention	at least 60%	Share of subscribers still active 12 months after enrollment
Session reporting compliance	at least 95%	Sessions with complete before, during and after reports filed
Alert rate (yellow or above)	under 2%	Share of dialoguers receiving any alert level per quarter
Cost per subscriber enrolled	around CHF 8 or less	Total program costs divided by new enrolled subscribers
Karma tokens distributed	tracked	Total Karma tokens distributed to dialoguers, published monthly

Quality criteria (proposed)

Quality standards proposed for this use case, inspired by ISO-style quality frameworks. They would be reviewed by the community.

Standard	Dimension	Criteria	Illustrative target
QS-SF-001	Process quality	Every dialoguer would complete the required training modules before the first session. Compliance verified automatically.	100% training compliance
QS-SF-002	Ethical standards	Zero tolerance for misleading subscription advice. Random audio monitoring (with consent) and subscriber satisfaction surveys are options under discussion.	0 confirmed violations
QS-SF-003	Service quality	Post-session feedback completed within 24 hours by all dialoguers. Feedback quality reviewed by User Group officers.	at least 95% feedback rate
QS-SF-004	User satisfaction	Annual subscriber survey: share who would recommend the subscription to others.	at least 70% would recommend
QS-SF-005	Governance	Each User Group would hold a general assembly and publish an anonymized activity report.	100% governance compliance

Rules

The detailed rules proposed for this use case (definition and scope, core principles, mandatory rules, ethical standards, User Group governance, alert system, best practices, exclusions, dispute resolution) are on a dedicated page: Street Fundraising Rules.

See also

• Street Fundraising Rules
• Programs (the Street Fundraising Program combines customizable deals from various marketplaces)
• Finance & Solidarity portal (this marketplace is listed there)
• Economy portal (Rewards, Karma tokens, Need-Driven Funding)

Portal structure (model)

This portal follows the standard WikiDeal market-portal structure. Each market portal offers the same set of content types (the base contract, models, amendments, addenda, lawyer-validated contracts, legal references, compensation, etc.), even when some are still empty:

📋 Portal structure: how this market portal works · full model
Rules of the game	Portal Main, the governing conventions for this portal
Base contract	Contract Base, the foundation contract and its clause cultures
Models	Contract Model(s), concrete models built on the base
Amendments	Base Amendment · Model Amendment
Addenda (avenants)	Base Addendum · Model Addendum
Lawyer-validated	Contract Validated, contracts validated by lawyers
Legal references	Legal Reference, by country and language
Compensation	Compensation, Conditions · Pricing & Scales · Karma tokens
Use cases	Use cases, real pilot examples
Alerts & prevention	Alerts & prevention, alerts, risks and common errors together
Statistics	Statistics, usage statistics and common error statistics
Signature	Signature, signature management, see the open call on contract signature
Tutorials	Tutorials · FAQ
Debates	Debates (Talk)

Some sections may still be empty: they are listed so the structure is available and ready to fill. Each element is explained on the Portal Structure Model page.