Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Funder-Stories: Difference between revisions

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{{ExpertIntro|We are heading towards transparent, algorithmic distribution of cooperative surplus through bonding curves and need-driven funding mechanisms. This hypothesis proposes that early-stage funders receive proportionally greater reward allocations due to reserve dynamics, while ongoing revenue is distributed linearly across all reward holders. The emerging trend suggests decentralized platforms are experimenting with hybrid models that balance individual incentive alignment with community pool allocations.}}

{{KidsIntro|This page shares stories from people who gave money to support WikiDeal.}}

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= Funder Stories: How Kim & Noah Earn Their Rewards =

From WikiDeal, ~~the~~ Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · ''Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept ([[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|credits]])''

From WikiDeal, a Wikipedia of e-commerce · Pilot 1, Prototype 1 · ''Socio-Technical Innovation, WikiDeal concept ([[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|credits]])''

WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, '''Kim''' and '''Noah''', to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through ~~Credit~~ allocation, to monthly rewards and cashout. These are illustrative examples based on the Prototype 1 model.

WikiDeal's financial mechanisms can seem complex at first. This page walks through two fictional but realistic profiles, '''Kim''' and '''Noah''', to show exactly how each step works: from initial contribution, through Reward allocation, to monthly rewards and cashout. These are illustrative examples based on the Prototype 1 model.

== Meet Kim & Noah ==

'''Kim''': A 34-year-old community organizer based in Seoul. Believes in cooperative economics and wants to support WikiDeal's early phase with CHF 1,000.

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== Step 1: The Contribution (Bonding Curve) ==

When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] formula. The bonding curve determines how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|~~Credits~~]] are issued in return. Crucially, the earlier a funder contributes (when the reserve is low), the more ~~Credits~~ they receive per CHF. This is the '''Bonding Curve advantage''', not a payout multiplier.

When a funder contributes CHF to WikiDeal, the amount is processed through the [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Bonding Curve|Bonding Curve]] formula. The bonding curve determines how many [[Gov/en/Portal:Economy/Rewards|Rewards]] are issued in return. Crucially, the earlier a funder contributes (when the reserve is low), the more Rewards they receive per CHF. This is the '''Bonding Curve advantage''', not a payout multiplier.

* '''Kim''' contributes CHF 1,000 → receives approximately CHF 100 worth of Rewards (example from bonding curve formula at r=0: ~100 CHF reward = ~10,000 ~~Credits~~ at CHF 0.01~~/Credit~~)

* '''Kim''' contributes CHF 1,000 → receives approximately CHF 100 worth of Rewards (example from bonding curve formula at r=0: ~100 CHF reward = ~10,000 Rewards at CHF 0.01 per Reward)

* '''Noah''' contributes CHF 5,000 → receives approximately CHF 476 worth of Rewards (~47,600 ~~Credits~~)

* '''Noah''' contributes CHF 5,000 → receives approximately CHF 476 worth of Rewards (~47,600 Rewards)

Early funders get more ~~Credits~~ per CHF because the reserve is low. As more contributions accumulate, the bonding curve adjusts, and each subsequent CHF ~~yields~~ fewer ~~Credits~~. This is an inherent property of the formula, not a promotional bonus.

Early funders get more Rewards per CHF because the reserve is low. As more contributions accumulate, the bonding curve adjusts, and each subsequent CHF brings fewer Rewards. This is an inherent property of the formula, not a promotional bonus.

== Step 2: ~~Credit~~ Allocation (~~The Boost~~) ==

== Step 2: Reward Allocation (Need-Driven Funding) ==

Not all ~~Credits~~ go directly to the funder. The [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Need-Driven Funding|Need-Driven Funding mechanism]] splits the total ~~Credits~~ between the funder's ~~personal~~ '''Rewards''' and a '''community pool'''. This allocation is determined at funding time: it does not change later.

Not all Rewards go directly to the funder. The [[Gov/en/Portal:R&D/Innovations:Need-Driven Funding|Need-Driven Funding mechanism]] splits the total Rewards between the funder's '''personal Rewards''' and a '''community pool'''. This allocation is determined at funding time: it does not change later.

* The ~~Boost~~ percentage (P2) defines how much goes to Rewards vs. the community pool.

* The Need-Driven Funding percentage (P2) defines how much goes to Rewards vs. the community pool.

* Example: if the ~~Boost~~ is set at '''70%''':

* Example: if the Need-Driven Funding percentage is set at '''70%''':

* Kim's 10,000 ~~Credits~~ → '''7,000 Rewards''' + 3,000 to the community pool

* Kim's 10,000 Rewards → '''7,000 personal Rewards''' + 3,000 to the community pool

* Noah's 47,600 ~~Credits~~ → '''33,320 Rewards''' + 14,280 to the community pool

* Noah's 47,600 Rewards → '''33,320 personal Rewards''' + 14,280 to the community pool

The community pool portion supports WikiDeal's broader civic and operational goals. The Rewards held by Kim and Noah are what generate future rewards.

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The primary ongoing reward mechanism is the distribution of WikiDeal's monthly subscription revenue across all Rewards in circulation. The formula is linear and transparent:

Revenue per ~~Credit~~ = Total monthly subscription revenue ÷ 100,000,000

Revenue per Reward = Total monthly subscription revenue ÷ 100,000,000

The denominator (100,000,000) represents the total ~~Credits~~ in the system. This keeps the formula stable and predictable as WikiDeal scales.

The denominator (100,000,000) represents the total Rewards in the system. This keeps the formula stable and predictable as WikiDeal scales.

=== Example Scenario ===

WikiDeal has '''50,000 active subscribers''' paying CHF 1/month = CHF 50,000/month total revenue.

* Revenue per ~~Credit~~ = CHF 50,000 ÷ 100,000,000 = '''CHF 0.0005''' per ~~Credit~~ per month

* Revenue per Reward = CHF 50,000 ÷ 100,000,000 = '''CHF 0.0005''' per Reward per month

* '''Kim''' (7,000 ~~Credits~~) earns: CHF 0.0005 × 7,000 = '''CHF 3.50/month'''

* '''Kim''' (7,000 Rewards) earns: CHF 0.0005 × 7,000 = '''CHF 3.50/month'''

* '''Noah''' (33,320 ~~Credits~~) earns: CHF 0.0005 × 33,320 = '''CHF 16.66/month'''

* '''Noah''' (33,320 Rewards) earns: CHF 0.0005 × 33,320 = '''CHF 16.66/month'''

=== Scaling Effect ===

As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all ~~Credit~~ holders:

As WikiDeal grows its subscriber base, rewards scale proportionally for all Reward holders:

{| class="wikitable wikitable"

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! Active Subscribers

! Monthly Revenue (CHF 1/sub)

! Revenue/~~Credit~~

! Revenue/Reward

! Kim (7,000 ~~Credits~~)

! Kim (7,000 Rewards)

! Noah (33,320 ~~Credits~~)

! Noah (33,320 Rewards)

|-

| 10,000

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|}

''Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber and a fixed ~~Credit~~ count for Kim and Noah. Actual rewards will vary based on real subscription pricing and total ~~Credits~~ in circulation.''

''Note: these figures assume CHF 1/month per subscriber and a fixed Reward count for Kim and Noah. Actual rewards will vary based on real subscription pricing and total Rewards in circulation.''

== Step 5: Cashout Conditions ==

Kim and Noah can convert their Rewards to CHF when the cashout conditions defined by the protocol are met. Key principles:

* '''No speculation:''' The CHF value of each ~~Credit~~ is defined entirely by the algorithm. There is no secondary market, no price volatility.

* '''No speculation:''' The CHF value of each Reward is defined entirely by the algorithm. There is no secondary market, no price volatility.

* '''Revenue-linked:''' Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to ~~back~~ the redemption. This ensures the system remains solvent and sustainable.

* '''Revenue-linked:''' Cashout is possible when sufficient subscription revenue has been generated to cover the redemption. This ensures the system remains solvent and sustainable.

* '''Transparent timing:''' The protocol defines clear thresholds for when cashout windows open, Kim and Noah can track this through their contributor dashboard.

* '''Proportional:''' Cashout amounts are proportional to the number of Rewards held and the current CHF value per ~~Credit~~ at the time of redemption.

* '''Proportional:''' Cashout amounts are proportional to the number of Rewards held and the current CHF value per Reward at the time of redemption.

This design eliminates speculative risk for contributors while ensuring WikiDeal can meet its obligations as it scales revenue.