Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Methods - Revision history

AI-Admin-Assistant: Reformulate stakes/consensus wording, Condorcet conditional relevance, sourced 2008 cycle reference, link history page

2026-07-05T13:58:51Z

Reformulate stakes/consensus wording, Condorcet conditional relevance, sourced 2008 cycle reference, link history page

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:58, 5 July 2026
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	{{KidsIntro\|Most decisions do not need a vote at all: people just try things, undo mistakes and talk. But when a big question really needs a vote, there are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}}		{{KidsIntro\|Most decisions do not need a vote at all: people just try things, undo mistakes and talk. But when a big question really needs a vote, there are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}}
	{{ExpertIntro\|None of these methods is meant for everyday decisions: formal voting~~, and Condorcet voting in particular,~~ is reserved for ~~complex or contested~~ questions ~~that need a clear~~, ~~settled outcome~~, after lighter tools (direct action, revert, discussion) have been tried. Survey of the voting methods WikiDeal is studying: simple majority, approval voting, ranked methods (Borda, instant-runoff), Condorcet methods with the Schulze completion, and single transferable vote for multi-seat elections. A worked 9-voter example shows a Condorcet winner losing under plurality. Each method is assessed against known criteria (clone independence, monotonicity) and known limits (Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, strategic voting). The mapping of methods to decision types is a first hypothesis, consistent with Wikimedia and Debian practice.}}		{{ExpertIntro\|None of these methods is meant for everyday decisions: formal voting is reserved for questions whose stakes, expressed by the number of people who raise them, call for it, after lighter tools (direct action, revert, discussion) have been tried. Condorcet voting in particular is considered relevant where a case is complex and there is a clear, shared perception that it must be put to a vote. Survey of the voting methods WikiDeal is studying: simple majority, approval voting, ranked methods (Borda, instant-runoff), Condorcet methods with the Schulze completion, and single transferable vote for multi-seat elections. A worked 9-voter example shows a Condorcet winner losing under plurality. Each method is assessed against known criteria (clone independence, monotonicity) and known limits (Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, strategic voting). The mapping of methods to decision types is a first hypothesis, consistent with Wikimedia and Debian practice.}}
	__TOC__		__TOC__

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	=== The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion ===		=== The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion ===

	Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it ~~happens~~ in real ~~elections (~~the Wikimedia Board election ~~of 2008 contained~~ such a ~~cycle~~ among mid-ranked candidates~~, see~~ the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]]).		Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it can be observed in real ballot data: the published pairwise table of the 2008 Wikimedia Board election shows such a circle among three mid-ranked candidates (the exact figures are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research#wikimedia-experience\|research page]] and the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Condorcet-History\|history and results page]]).

	The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis ~~reserves~~ it ~~for~~ complex multi-option ~~decisions~~. Even then, a Schulze ballot is intended as a complement to the simpler tools, not a replacement: a contribution that can simply be reverted needs no vote, and a disagreement that discussion can settle needs none either.		The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis considers it relevant where a decision is complex and multi-option, and where the need to vote at all is clearly and widely perceived. Even then, a Schulze ballot is intended as a complement to the simpler tools, not a replacement: a contribution that can simply be reverted needs no vote, and a disagreement that discussion can settle needs none either.

	<span id="stv"></span>		<span id="stv"></span>
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	\|}		\|}

	'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main\|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules\|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits\|Licensing and credits]]		'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main\|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules\|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Condorcet-History\|Condorcet history and results]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits\|Licensing and credits]]

	[[Category:Migration June 2026]]		[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
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AI-Admin-Assistant: Intros and body state upfront that formal voting (Condorcet) is reserved for complex contested questions; links to ladder of decision tools

2026-07-05T13:17:09Z

Intros and body state upfront that formal voting (Condorcet) is reserved for complex contested questions; links to ladder of decision tools

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:17, 5 July 2026
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	{{KidsIntro\|~~There~~ are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}}		{{KidsIntro\|Most decisions do not need a vote at all: people just try things, undo mistakes and talk. But when a big question really needs a vote, there are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}}
	{{ExpertIntro\|Survey of the voting methods WikiDeal is studying: simple majority, approval voting, ranked methods (Borda, instant-runoff), Condorcet methods with the Schulze completion, and single transferable vote for multi-seat elections. A worked 9-voter example shows a Condorcet winner losing under plurality. Each method is assessed against known criteria (clone independence, monotonicity) and known limits (Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, strategic voting). The mapping of methods to decision types is a first hypothesis, consistent with Wikimedia and Debian practice.}}		{{ExpertIntro\|None of these methods is meant for everyday decisions: formal voting, and Condorcet voting in particular, is reserved for complex or contested questions that need a clear, settled outcome, after lighter tools (direct action, revert, discussion) have been tried. Survey of the voting methods WikiDeal is studying: simple majority, approval voting, ranked methods (Borda, instant-runoff), Condorcet methods with the Schulze completion, and single transferable vote for multi-seat elections. A worked 9-voter example shows a Condorcet winner losing under plurality. Each method is assessed against known criteria (clone independence, monotonicity) and known limits (Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, strategic voting). The mapping of methods to decision types is a first hypothesis, consistent with Wikimedia and Debian practice.}}
	__TOC__		__TOC__

	= Voting methods under study =		= Voting methods under study =

	''Status: first hypothesis (draft). WikiDeal has not adopted any voting method yet. This page documents the options being explored. Rules of procedure are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules\|Voting rules]] page; evidence and sources are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]].''		''Status: first hypothesis (draft). WikiDeal has not adopted any voting method yet. This page documents the options being explored. When to vote at all is treated on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main#ladder-of-tools\|portal main page]]: most decisions are intended to be settled by lighter tools (direct action, revert, discussion), and a formal vote is a last resort. Rules of procedure are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules\|Voting rules]] page; evidence and sources are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]].''

	<span id="simple-majority"></span>		<span id="simple-majority"></span>
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	Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it happens in real elections (the Wikimedia Board election of 2008 contained such a cycle among mid-ranked candidates, see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]]).		Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it happens in real elections (the Wikimedia Board election of 2008 contained such a cycle among mid-ranked candidates, see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]]).

	The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis reserves it for complex multi-option decisions.		The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis reserves it for complex multi-option decisions. Even then, a Schulze ballot is intended as a complement to the simpler tools, not a replacement: a contribution that can simply be reverted needs no vote, and a disagreement that discussion can settle needs none either.

	<span id="stv"></span>		<span id="stv"></span>
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	== Which method for which decision ==		== Which method for which decision ==

	First hypothesis, to be validated:		First hypothesis, to be validated. This table applies only once a decision actually needs a formal vote; most decisions are intended to be settled earlier by direct action, revert and discussion (see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main#ladder-of-tools\|ladder of decision tools]]):

	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"

AI-Admin-Assistant: Update internal links after move to dedicated Voting portal

2026-07-05T04:12:25Z

Update internal links after move to dedicated Voting portal

AI-Admin-Assistant: AI-Admin-Assistant moved page Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Methods to Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Methods: Voting cluster becomes a dedicated portal (Portal:Voting), redirect kept

2026-07-05T04:12:18Z

AI-Admin-Assistant moved page Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Methods to Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Methods: Voting cluster becomes a dedicated portal (Portal:Voting), redirect kept

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:12, 5 July 2026
(No difference)

AI-Admin-Assistant: Create voting methods page (draft): majority, approval, ranked, Condorcet/Schulze with worked example, STV, Arrow/Gibbard-Satterthwaite limits

2026-07-05T03:49:58Z

Create voting methods page (draft): majority, approval, ranked, Condorcet/Schulze with worked example, STV, Arrow/Gibbard-Satterthwaite limits

New page

{{KidsIntro|There are many ways to count votes. Sometimes the biggest pile of hands wins. Sometimes you rank your favorites, like first, second and third place. This page explains the main ways of voting, with a small example, so you can see why the counting method can change who wins.}}
{{ExpertIntro|Survey of the voting methods WikiDeal is studying: simple majority, approval voting, ranked methods (Borda, instant-runoff), Condorcet methods with the Schulze completion, and single transferable vote for multi-seat elections. A worked 9-voter example shows a Condorcet winner losing under plurality. Each method is assessed against known criteria (clone independence, monotonicity) and known limits (Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, strategic voting). The mapping of methods to decision types is a first hypothesis, consistent with Wikimedia and Debian practice.}}
__TOC__

= Voting methods under study =

''Status: first hypothesis (draft). WikiDeal has not adopted any voting method yet. This page documents the options being explored. Rules of procedure are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Rules|Voting rules]] page; evidence and sources are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Research|research page]].''


== Simple majority ==

The most familiar method: an option wins if more than half of the votes support it ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_rule majority rule]). It is simple, fast and easy to verify, which makes it a good candidate for binary questions (adopt or reject a proposal, confirm or not a mandate).

Its main limit appears as soon as there are more than two options: with three or more candidates, the option with the most votes ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting plurality]) can win while a majority of voters actually prefer another option. The worked example below shows this.


== Approval voting ==

In [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting approval voting], each voter marks all the options they find acceptable, and the option approved by the most voters wins. It is barely more complex than simple majority, works with any number of options, and tends to favor broadly acceptable options. Its limits: it does not capture the strength of preferences, and voters face a strategic question about where to draw their approval line ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_voting tactical voting]).


== Ranked voting ==

In [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_voting ranked voting], voters order the options: first choice, second choice, and so on. A ranking carries much more information than a single cross, which matters when the decision is complex. Several counting rules exist for the same ranked ballots, and they can produce different winners:

* The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count Borda count] gives points by rank position. It is simple but very sensitive to the addition of similar options.
* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting Instant-runoff voting] eliminates the weakest option round by round. It is widely used but fails some fairness criteria, including [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] (ranking an option higher can, in rare cases, make it lose).


== Condorcet methods and the Schulze method ==

A [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method Condorcet method] compares every pair of options: if one option beats every other option in head-to-head comparisons, it is the Condorcet winner. The idea goes back to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marquis_de_Condorcet Marquis de Condorcet] in the 18th century.


=== A worked example ===

Nine voters rank three options A, B and C:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Voters !! Ranking
|-
| 4 voters || A, then B, then C
|-
| 3 voters || B, then C, then A
|-
| 2 voters || C, then B, then A
|}

Counting only first choices, A wins with 4 votes out of 9. But the head-to-head comparisons tell another story:

* B against A: 5 voters prefer B (3 + 2), 4 prefer A. '''B beats A.'''
* B against C: 7 voters prefer B (4 + 3), 2 prefer C. '''B beats C.'''
* C against A: 5 voters prefer C (3 + 2), 4 prefer A. '''C beats A.'''

B beats every other option one-on-one: B is the Condorcet winner, even though A had the most first choices. A majority of voters (5 out of 9) ranked A last, and a Condorcet count respects that.


=== The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion ===

Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it happens in real elections (the Wikimedia Board election of 2008 contained such a cycle among mid-ranked candidates, see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Research|research page]]).

The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis reserves it for complex multi-option decisions.


== Single transferable vote ==

When several seats have to be filled at once (a committee, a board), electing each seat separately can leave large minorities without any representation. The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_transferable_vote single transferable vote] (STV) uses ranked ballots to reach [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_representation proportional representation]: options that pass a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droop_quota quota] are elected and their surplus votes are transferred to the next preferences. Several [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counting_single_transferable_votes counting variants] exist; the Wikimedia Foundation adopted Meek's variant for its Board elections in 2021.


== What theory says: there is no perfect method ==

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_choice_theory Social choice theory] proves that the search for a flawless voting method is hopeless in the strict sense:

* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem Arrow's impossibility theorem] ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Arrow Kenneth Arrow], 1951) shows that no ranked voting method can satisfy a small set of natural fairness conditions at the same time.
* The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%E2%80%93Satterthwaite_theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem] shows that every reasonable voting method can, in some situations, be manipulated by strategic voting.

The practical conclusion is not that voting is pointless, but that methods must be chosen for the properties that matter most in each context, and that the choice of method is itself a governance decision. This is the basis of the principle stated on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Main|cluster main page]]: match the method to the complexity of the decision.


== Which method for which decision ==

First hypothesis, to be validated:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Decision !! Envisaged method !! Why
|-
| Binary questions || Simple majority || Simple, fast, verifiable
|-
| Complex multi-option choices || Schulze (Condorcet) || Respects head-to-head majorities, clone-independent, monotonic
|-
| Multi-seat elections || Single transferable vote || Proportional representation of the community
|-
| Everyday editorial decisions || Consensus, votes as last resort || Keeps discussion and improvement first
|-
| Structural changes || Majority with supermajority threshold || Stability of foundations
|}

'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Main|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Rules|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Institutions/Voting-Research|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits|Licensing and credits]]

[[Category:Migration June 2026]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:12, 5 July 2026
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	= Voting methods under study =		= Voting methods under study =

	''Status: first hypothesis (draft). WikiDeal has not adopted any voting method yet. This page documents the options being explored. Rules of procedure are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Rules\|Voting rules]] page; evidence and sources are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Research\|research page]].''		''Status: first hypothesis (draft). WikiDeal has not adopted any voting method yet. This page documents the options being explored. Rules of procedure are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules\|Voting rules]] page; evidence and sources are on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]].''

	<span id="simple-majority"></span>		<span id="simple-majority"></span>
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	=== The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion ===		=== The Condorcet paradox and the Schulze completion ===

	Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it happens in real elections (the Wikimedia Board election of 2008 contained such a cycle among mid-ranked candidates, see the [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Research\|research page]]).		Sometimes there is no Condorcet winner: A can beat B, B beat C, and C beat A, like rock-paper-scissors. This is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox Condorcet paradox], and it happens in real elections (the Wikimedia Board election of 2008 contained such a cycle among mid-ranked candidates, see the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|research page]]).

	The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis reserves it for complex multi-option decisions.		The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method Schulze method] resolves these cycles by comparing chains of victories (beatpaths): a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the option with the strongest chains wins. The Schulze method always elects the Condorcet winner when one exists, satisfies [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion monotonicity] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion independence of clones] (adding a similar option does not change the outcome), and is used by free software communities such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian Debian]. This combination of properties is why the initial hypothesis reserves it for complex multi-option decisions.
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	* The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%E2%80%93Satterthwaite_theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem] shows that every reasonable voting method can, in some situations, be manipulated by strategic voting.		* The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%E2%80%93Satterthwaite_theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem] shows that every reasonable voting method can, in some situations, be manipulated by strategic voting.

	The practical conclusion is not that voting is pointless, but that methods must be chosen for the properties that matter most in each context, and that the choice of method is itself a governance decision. This is the basis of the principle stated on the [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Main\|~~cluster~~ main page]]: match the method to the complexity of the decision.		The practical conclusion is not that voting is pointless, but that methods must be chosen for the properties that matter most in each context, and that the choice of method is itself a governance decision. This is the basis of the principle stated on the [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main\|portal main page]]: match the method to the complexity of the decision.

	<span id="which-method"></span>		<span id="which-method"></span>
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	\|}		\|}

	'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Main\|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Rules\|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:~~Institutions~~/~~Voting-~~Research\|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits\|Licensing and credits]]		'''See also:''' [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Main\|Voting at WikiDeal]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Rules\|Voting rules]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Voting/Research\|Voting research and experience]] · [[Gov/en/Portal:Meta/Licensing-and-Credits\|Licensing and credits]]

	[[Category:Migration June 2026]]		[[Category:Migration June 2026]]
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